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Performance-based contracting (PBC) is becoming increasingly attractive to public 
human service agencies. By attaching contract compensation to contractors’ 
performance achievement, PBC is expected to encourage quality services, better 
outcomes, and less administrative monitoring. However, the burgeoning popularity of 
PBC lacks sufficient evidence to confirm these promised benefits. In particular, the 
efforts of introducing PBC into human service systems needs first to address the 
effectiveness problem, i.e., whether PBC really produces better results. This problem 
constitutes the research question of the research project. 
 
After building the theoretical framework which incorporates the literature on formal 
and relational contracting, this project explores the effectiveness question using 
Indiana vocational rehabilitation program as a case. In particular, the study evaluates 
PBC effectiveness from two perspectives: service outcome and participating 
organizations. From a service-outcome perspective, the research employs a quasi-
  
experimental design to compare the impacts of two contract arrangements, PBC and 
fee-for-service (FFS), on individual employment outcomes. From a participating-
organization perspective, the project runs semi-structured interviews with service 
counselors and contractors. Triangulating these findings, this project proposes that 
PBC seems more promising than FFS in human services. It also implies PBC 
effectiveness might not be well-rounded and should not be exaggerated. 
 
Further, the study addresses the managerial implications of the findings. The research 
and the practice of PBC tend to ignore the relational face of contracting. PBC as a 
formal arrangement is always disturbed by the highly uncertain nature of human 
services and thus might result in incomplete performance improvement and contractor 
opportunism. If so, relational contracting, using informal and normative mechanisms, 
may enable desirable collaborative outcomes. The combination of formal PBC efforts 
with relational contracting would encourage high-quality results. 
 
In sum, this project represents an attempt to systematically examine PBC 
effectiveness in human services. It shows the difficulties and dynamics of introducing 
performance management to human service contracting. It also warns the launch of 
PBC systems should be very deliberate and careful. More broadly, the project 
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Chapter 1. The Rise of Performance-based Contracting 
 
1.1  The Management Imperative under the Contracting Regime  
 
In Preface to Public Administration, Stillman (1991) delineates the “stateless” origins 
of American public administration. He argues a systematic design or thought of 
public administration was absent at the founding of the United States. “America’s 
‘missing state’ at its inception,” Stillman (1991) believes,  “fundamentally shapes our 
way of thinking about, as well as doing, public administration today” (19). Further, to 
prevent abuse of public power, private power was relied on as much as possible. In 
this line, America has an ingrained tradition of using private power, in additon to 
public administrative capacity, to solve public problems (Kingdon, 1999). 
Government contracting, the most common type of privatization (Savas, 1987), is 
thus so widely and durably used as a government tool that it has become a remarkable 
feature of the American governance system. At all levels of governments, the massive 
use of government contracting to provide public goods and services and achieve 
policy priorities is a common government practice. Accordingly,“government by 
proxy” (Kettl, 1988), “hollow state” (Milward & Provan, 2000), and many other 
labels have been attached to the public administration narrative. 
 
In recent years, government contracting is becoming more dynamic, including not 
only contracting out, but contracting back-in. Decades of contracting-out experiences 




contracting management and monitoring capacities has given rise to “reverse 
contracting”, restoring from third-party delivery back to in-house delivery (Hefetz & 
Warner, 2004). Even so, there is still no evidence to see the ebb of contracting. 
Virtually every government is dependent on contracts to a varying degree. At the 
federal level, according to USASpenidng.gov, more than one third of federal 
spending is used under the titles of “Contracts” and “Grants” from fiscal years 2000 
to 2010 on average1. Again, at the local level, the scope of contracting is equally 
prominent. Approximately 45.5% of local government services are delivered through 
contracting in 2007 (Warner & Hefetz, 2009). A recent survey of U.S. local 
government managers shows that 93% of municipal officials support government 
contracting (Girth & Johnston, 2011). 
 
The field of human services is an indispensable component of government 
contracting. In fact, the use of government contracting in human services occurs 
much earlier than contracting for other goods and services in the United States. The 
historic roots can be dated back to the colonial period (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). 
Today, governments at every level do very little directly by themselves in human 
service provision. Rather, they fund third-party actors through government contracts 
to provide services (Salamon, 1995). Among them, nonprofits deliver a large share of 
government funded human services. All over the United States, for example, 56.3% 
of homeless shelters, 35.9% of drug and alcohol treatment programs, and 32.8% of 
day care facilities are run by nonprofits in local communities (Warner & Hefetz, 
2009). In 2009, governments at all levels contracted with 33,000 human service 
1 Data come from www.usaspending.gov (accessed on January 30, 2012). 
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nonprofits for approximately 200,000 contracts and grants worth over $100 billion 
(Boris, de Leon, Roeger, & Nikolova, 2010). Such an extensive government-
nonprofit partnership features the U.S. human service delivery system, termed by 
Smith and Lipsky (1993) as “contracting regime” or by Salamon (Salamon, 1987) as 
“third-party government”.  
 
The significant explosion of contracting fundamentally reshapes the features and 
businesses of government. In a political sense, contractors constitute an important 
pillar of American institutions in serving democratic governance and citizenship 
(Smith & Lipsky, 1993, Cooper, 2003). The policy goals and missions of grand 
federal and state programs now depends on contractors to represent and realize. 
Contractors thus act as a critical buffer between the state and citizens. In a managerial 
sense, since government programs are dependent on contract operation, the 
performance of government turns to be largely contingent on contractors 
(Frederickson & Frederickson, 2006; Kettl, 2002). In short, sound contracting 
performance will not only directly improve government performance, but indirectly 
improve democratic governance (Behn, 2002). This further raises the critical issue of 
contracting management. “It makes no sense to speak of effective public policy or of 
professional public management, or even informed citizenship, without an awareness 
of the nature and operation of public contract management” (Cooper, 2003, 12). 
 
Indeed, contracting is not a panacea with self-enforcing nature. Government’s retreat 




effeciciency improvement, “load-shedding,” or both, does not simply eliminate 
government role. Although contractors provide various services to citizens as proxies 
of the state, government continues to bear the responsibility for satisfactory service 
delivery. The explosion of contracting actually calls for a different government role. 
Using Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) metaphor, government now should be “steering 
not rowing.” The governance by contracting mode gives prominence to contracting 
management capacity, i.e., if government is able to act as a “smart buyer” throughout 
the contracting process (Kettl, 1993). “The most fundemental problem with the 
current system,” as Kelman (2002) suggests, “is that it insufficiently recognizes 
contract administration as in the first instance a mangagement function” (93). Given 
the large scope of contracting employed by governments, he further argues that “the 
ability to manage contracting must be considered a core competency of the 
organization” (89). 
 
However, managing indirect government tools is very different from managing goods 
and service production within traditional government bureaucries. A central puzzle 
for public managers in contracting management, as Kettl (2002) summarizes, is that 
“[t]hey are responsible for ensuring high-quality results in programs that they do not 
directly control” (493). The reliance on contracting in public management represents 
a significant shift away from a vertical, authority-based model to a horizontal, 
negotiation-driven model (Cooper, 2003). When government directly delivers 
services, there is a clear clain of commands within government domain and all the 




indirect government tools are introduced into governance system, such authority 
relationship is absent. All the relationships underlying indirect government tools are 
now based on volunttary market exchange. “The basic administrative problem of 
indirect government thus is developing effective managemewnt mechanisms [such as 
bargaining and incentive system] to replace command and control” (Kettl, 2002, 491). 
Therefore, the managerial responsibility turns “to arrange networks rather than to 
carry out the traditional task of government, which is to manage hierarchies” 
(Milward & Provan, 2000, 362). 
  
Effective contracting management requires public managers’ sensible answers to the 
questions of “what to buyer, who to buy it from, and what it has bought” (Kettl, 1993, 
180). Accorrdingly, it calls for “personnel with contract-management experience, 
policy expertise, negotiation, bargaining, and mediation skills, oversight and program 
audit capabilities, and the necessary communivation and political skills to manage 
programs with third parties in a complex political environment” (Van Slyke, 2003). 
However, in contrast to the ubiquitous use of contracting and the critical role of 
contracting management within is the finding that contracting management capacity 
is often insufficient, which “create[s] serious public management and accountability 
problems for which public administration theory fails to prepare us” (Salamon, 1989, 
11). For example, Van Slyke (2003) finds serious capacity shortage in social service 
contracting management in New York state, as demonstrated by loss of contract 
management expertise, institutional memory, and capacity constraints. Smith and 




that limited administrative resources (personnel and budget) undermine contracting 
management capacity, and program evaluations are often difficult. When examining 
contracting management in local governments from 1997 to 2007, Joaquin and 
Greitens (2012) observe a significant decline in mamagement capacity in agenda 
setting, formulation, and implementation. This decline is even more significant as 
local governments contract out more complex goods and services. 
 
“The poor management of service contracts,” the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) (2001) concludes, “undermines the government’s ability to obtain good 
value for the money spent” (5). The deficit of management capacity in the use of 
contracting would incur substantial uncertainty in aligning private market with public 
interest (Kettl, 1993). “Any uncertainty surrounding the relation between market 
means and public ends, any range of discretion or ambiguity,” as Donahue and Nye 
(2002) argues, “will result, … in effort gravitatingf toward the focus of intensity 
(private interest)” (7-8). 
 
In short, contracting management is a demanding and distinct craft. To address this 
challenge, public management schoarship in the last two decades was marked by a 
surge of exploration of with various capacity-building mechanisms, such as 
rationalizing make-or-buy decisions by  balancing contracting out and contracting 
back-in (Brudney, Fernandez, Ryu, & Wright, 2005; Hefetz & Warner, 2004; 
Johnston & Romzek, 1999), managing thin service markets to stimulate and maintain 




2008), relying more on relational contracting to supplement formal contracts (Bertelli 
& Smith, 2010; Van Slyke, 2007), designing appropriate monitoring tools to tailor 
contractor incentives and ownership (Amirkhanyan, 2010; Lambright, 2009), 
improving contract design (Kim & Brown, 2012), and discovering new accountability 
mechanisms (Romzek & Johnston, 2005; Romzek, LeRoux, & Blackmar, 2012). 
Under this context, performance-based contracting (PBC), incorporting performance 
incentives into contract specification and compensation, comes to the agenda of 
public managers at all levels of governments.  
 
1.2  Performance-based Contracting as a New Experiment 
 
Currently, performance-based contracting (PBC) is enjoying a widespread popularity 
and acclaim as a preferred contracting approach in government acquisition of a 
variety of goods and services. PBC may also be referred as to result-based 
contracting, performance-based acquisition, and result-based funding in different 
contexts. Despite the burgeoning popularity, the connotation of PBC is still quite 
elusive. Martin (1999) thinks PBC “focuses on the outputs, quality and outcomes of 
service provision and may tie at least a portion of a contractor’s payment as well as 
any contract extension or renewal to their achievement” (1). Cooper (2003) considers 
PBC should “include incentive and penalty clauses that provide benchmarks to assess 
performance as well as mechanisms to encourage contractors to exceed those 






Federal acquisition regulation (FAR) provides a more technical definition: 
“Performance-based contracts (a) describe the requirements in terms of results 
required rather than the methods of performance of the work; (b) use measurable 
performance standards (i.e., terms of quality, timeliness, quantity, etc.) and quality 
assurance surveillance plans; (c) specify procedures for reductions of fee or for 
reductions to the price of a fixed-price contract when services are not performed or do 
not meet contract requirements; and (d) include performance incentives where 
appropriate” (FAR 37.601). In this way, PBC could “ensure that required 
performance quality levels are achieved and that total payment is related to the degree 
that services performed meet contract standards” (FAR 37.601). 
 
In this study, PBC is defined in a loose way as an “umbrella” term: PBC incorporates 
performance measures in contract specifications and makes contract compensations 
(such as payment, extension, and renewal) fully or partially contingent on 
performance achievements. Suggested by FAR 37, a performance-based contract may 
include (1) a performance-based work statement, which specifies the work in a 
quantifiable and measurable way; (2) measurable performance standards in terms of 
quality, quantity, and timeliness; (3) methods measuring contractor’s performance 
against the performance standards; (4) performance incentives tied to the performance 
standards (FAR 37.6). Based on this, public agencies have designed a variety of PBC 
models. The variance between different models largely centers on five dimensions: 
(1) payment schedule, (2) the extent to which incentives/disincentives are used, (3) 




performance indicator development, and (5) level of financial risks assumed by 
contractors.  
 
Traditionally, services are procured using a fee-for-service (FFS) contracting 
approach. This contracting method specifies the standards on inputs and delivery 
process, such as amount of time and labor required, and detailed procedures to be 
followed in delivering services. When services are delivered, contractors are 
reimbursed based on units of service delivered throughout the service process. 
Compared with FFS, conceptually, PBC represents several substantial changes in the 
landscape of service contracting. 
 
First, PBC changes contract specification method, from a design specification 
(focusing on input and process) to a performance specification (focusing on output, 
quality, and outcome) (See Figure 1) (Martin, 2005). Under PBC, public managers 
clearly specify the desired end results that service contractors should achieve, while 
leaving contractors considerable flexibility and freedom to prescribe service methods 
and use of funds to accomplish those goals. By tying contract compensation 
contingent on performance achievement, public managers contract for service 
outcomes, no longer for services per se. Relating to the change in contract 
specification, PBC presents new challenges for public managers. Under FFS, public 
managers are responsible for specifying the standards on inputs and the details of 




managers are expected to specify outcomes, designing incentives, and evaluating 
outcomes, leaving contractors to produce desired results.  
 
Figure 1.  A System Framework of Service Process 
 
Source: Martin (2005). 
 
Second, the same as other performance management strategies, PBC implies a change 
in accountability mechanisms, with increasing attention to accountability for results. 
This, using Al Gore’s (1993) words, represents “a fundamental shift in the system of 
accountability … from one oriented around accountability for processes and inputs to 
one that measures performance and is accountable for results actually achieved” (17). 
Embedded in a web of competing legitimate expectations, PBC represents a switch 
away from a hierarchical accountability with input and process orientations toward a 
professional accountability that allows for the exercise of professional discretion and 
expertise to achieve targeted results (Romzek, 2000). 
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Generally, PBC is expected to promote better service outcomes. PBC, by making 
contract compensations attached to performance achievements, draws contractors’ 
attention toward the results of service delivery, away from service delivery per se. 
The discussion on performance management is always based on the notion of “what 
gets measured gets done” – when people are given clearly measured targets, they 
would pay sufficient attention to achieve them. Follwing this line of reasoning, PBC 
would encourage service performance improvement. Further, as contractors are given 
much freedom in service process to prescribe services, the amount of administrative 
reporting and paperwork required by public agencies is greatly reduced. As such, 
contractors are believed to devote more time and energy to designing quality and 
innovative services to match client needs, which again enhances service outcomes. 
Combining these two together, PBC promises greater government acquisition 
efficiency, i.e., doing more with less. Under PBC, only contractor efforts that result in 
desired outcomes would be reimbursed, which maximizes the productivity of 
administrative resources. Less government monitoring also reduces administrative 
costs substantially.  
 
In its essence, PBC stands for a marriage of service contracting with performance 
management, two prevalent managerial tools in contemporary public administrative 
narrative. On one hand, as mentioned earlier, service contracting has been a common 
and desired practice at virtually all levels of governments. Today, governments 
heavily collaborate with third-party nongovernmental actors to deliver various 




widespread use of contracting, contracting management is often found to be 
problematic. In this vein, PBC, by introducing performance measures into contracting 
management, can be seen as an endeavor in helping address this challenge. 
 
On the other hand, PBC is an extension of government performance management 
strategy. Although performance measurement in government management appeared 
as early as the beginning of the twentieth century (Williams, 2003), the popularity of 
“performance” in public administration discourse is largely due to the Government 
Reinventing movement in the early 1990s (Kettl, 2005; Radin, 2006). The 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), drawing government attentions 
on federal programs away from rules and process to results, service quality, and 
customer satisfaction, became the prelude of the nationwide performance movement. 
Gradually, governments at all levels started to adopt performance measures in 
resource allocation and program management and establish a variety of pay-for-
performance systems to align budgetary and managerial decisions with performance 
achievements (e.g., Behn, 2003; Hatry, 2006; Heinrich, 2002; Joyce, 1993; Kravchuk 
& Schack, 1996).  
 
At the outset, performance management activities were mostly run within government 
organization domain. However, as public administration evolves, more and more 
indirect government tools (e.g., contracts, grants) are introduced into the governance 
system (Salamon, 2002). Public administration today is no longer a tale of 




performance depends on not only direct government tools, but indirect ones. As 
Frederickson and Frederickson (2006) show, the strength of an agency performance 
nowadays is deeply embedded in the characteristics of third-party grantees and 
contractors. With the nationwide performance movement keeping reshaping and 
redefining the structure and process of public administration activities, it is inevitable 
to witness the expansion of performance elements to the management of indirect 
government tools, forming a relatively comprehensive government performance 
management system. PBC thus becomes an indispensible part therein (See Figure 2). 
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As said, the extensive use of government contracting as an indirect government tool 
to deliver products and achieve policy goals has fundamentally redefined the U.S. 
governance system, in both political and managerial senses. In this way, the 
management of contracting process to ensure high-quality results becomes an 
imperative challenge. Unfortunately, public management literature has documented 
that public managers at all levels of governments fail to address this challenge 
effectively. As a response, public management scholarship and practice in recent 
decades have conducted a huge amount of exploration of effective contracting 
management strategies. Inspired by performance management movement, PBC 
represents one of the most recent efforts. By attaching contract compensations to 
contract performance, rather than the delivery of service per se, PBC promises better 
outcomes, less service costs and administrative monitoring. Given these potential 
benefits, PBC is currently very popular in a variety of service areas and advocated by 
different levels of governments. However, PBC is not a brand-new managerial tool; 
its historical root could be dated back to two decades ago. Moreover, even with the 
historical evolvement of PBC in mind, the documented evidence on PBC 
















Chapter 2. Burgeoning Popularity, Different Models, and Elusive 
Effectiveness 
 
2.1  The Evolution of PBC at Federal Level 
 
Federal agencies have used PBC to varying degrees for acquiring a wide range of 
goods and services. Although PBC has been referred to in government regulations, 
guidances, and policies for about two decades, the historical root of PBC in the 
federal government can be dated back to even earlier. For example, in the early 
1970s, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare attempted to introduce PBC in educational services. Some 
school districts contracted out some portion of their instructional activities with 
private companies and attached contract payment to the extent to which contractors 
helped students learn (Gramlich & Koshel, 1975; Mecklenburger, 1972; Levine, 
American Educational Research, & American Association of School, 1972). The 
results of the initiative were quite mixed and problems arose in the implementation 
process. Participating organizations failed to reach consensus on several important 
questions such as the validity of standardized tests as achievement measures and what 
should be measured. The efforts of introducing PBC to educational services in this 
experiment were soon dropped. 
 
Despite the early trial, federal implementation of PBC was not fully pursued until the 




enthusianism. Overall, the exploration of PBC in the federal government formally 
began in 1990s, represented by the appearance of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy’s (OFPP) Policy Letter 91-2 on Service Contracting. The policy letter believed 
that PBC “enhances the Government’s ability to acquire services of the requisite 
quality and to ensure adequate contractor performance,” and advocated that all federal 
agencies should “use performance based contracting methods to the maximum extent 
practicable when acquiring services”. In 1994, OMB initiated a governmentwide pilot 
project to encourage the use of PBC in federal agencies. In 1997, the Federal 
Acquisition Circular 97-01 amended the FAR to implement OFPP policy letter 91-2 
and confirmed the policy that PBC should be used as the preferred service acquisition 
method (FAR 37.102). The FAR currently establishes a policy that federal agencies 
use PBC to the maximum extent practicable for service acquisition. 
 
This preference on PBC remains in recent years. In fiscal year 2001, federal agencies 
reported a $28.6 billion use of PBC, 21% of the total obligations ($135.8 billion) 
incurred for services (GAO, 2002). The Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003 
also lends its strong support for PBC. In fiscal years 2005-2007, federal agencies 
were required to apply PBC to 40% of eligible service actions, including contracts, 
task orders, modifications, and options. In fiscal year 2008, they were encouraged to 
expand their PBC efforts on eligible service actions to 50%. OFFP also mandated that 
federal agencies to submit performance-based acquisition agency-wide management 




to eligible service contracts. Table 1 provides a brief roadmap of the historical 
evolvement of PBC use in the federal government.  
 





1980 OFPP A Guide for Writing and Administering Performance 
Statements of Work for Service Contracts 
1991 OFPP Policy Letter 91-2  
1993  Government Performance and Results Act  
1994 OFPP Performance-Based Service Contracting Pledge  
1997 OFPP Memo on “Performance-Based Service Contracting 
Checklist”  
1997 FAC (Federal 
Acquisition 
Circular) 
FAC 97-01  
1998 OFPP Report on Performance-Based Service Contracting Pilot 
Project  
1998 OFPP Best Practices for Performance-Based Service 
Contracting  
2000 National Defense 
Authorization Act 
FY 2001 
Statutory Preference for Performance-Based Service 
Contracting 
2001 FAC FAC 97-25  
2001 OMB Memo on “Performance Goals and Management 
Initiatives for FY 2002 Budget” 
2002 FAC FAC 2001-07  
2002 GAO Report on “Guidance Needed for Using Performance 
Based Service Contracting” 
2003 OFPP Report on “Performance-Based Service Acquisition: 
Contracting for the Future” 
2004 OFPP Memo on “Increasing the Use of Performance-Based 
Service Acquisition” 
2006 OFPP Memo on “Use of Performance-Based Acquisitions” 
2007 OFPP Memo on “Using Performance-Based Acquisition to 





2007 OFPP Memo on “Fiscal Year 2008 Performance-Based 
Acquisition Performance Goal” 
 
 
2.2  Popularity at State and Local Levels 
 
State and local governments have also shown growing interest in using PBC in the 
purchase of goods and services. Almost every state has introduced PBC in their 
acquisition efforts to some extent. Although there is no uniform effort in state and 
local governments that responds to the federal initiatives, their explorations of PBC 
are much more dynamic and diverse. For example, Washington State issued 
Executive Order 10-07 on Performance-based Contracting in 2010, advocating the 
use of PBC. It requires all state agencies shall (1) require that new contracts for 
products and services meet performance-based contracting standard, (2) review 
existing contract prior to renewal and update as necessary to reflect performance-
based contracting standards, and (3) ensure performance-based contracts are actively 
managed to meet performance-based standards. 
 
Particularly in human services, the interest in PBC is expanding rapidly. In Maine, 
State Statutes mandate the use of PBC in all human service contracting (Me. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 214). In California, eight of the nine counties in Southern 
California are using PBC in services such as employment training, aging and adult, 
and juvenile services, with most tying contract payment to a set of defined service 
outcome milestones (Daly, Tucker-Tatlow, & Gibson, 2004). New York City is 




human service contracts there have already included performance indicators and 
linked contract payment or renewal to contactor achievement in these indicators 
(Krauskopf, 2008). Although the detailed PBC designs in these states may vary, the 
motivations behind the injection of PBC into state efforts in service acquisitions are 
basically the same: to help align human service systems' focus on outcomes with how 
services are financed. Through restructuring contract specifications and 
compensations, human service agencies bind contractors with their service outcomes 
and maximize service acquisition efficiency. Overall, PBC is widely used in four 
human service areas: substance abuse treatment, child welfare, mental health, and 
employment training. The following discussion provides some documented evidence 
of PBC use in these fields. Although the survey here could not be exhaustive, it does 
make sense of the current status of PBC in human service provision. 
 
Substance Abuse Treatment 
 
The U.S. Institute of Medicine has advocated the use of performance measures in 
payment systems to promote quality improvement in treatment services since early 
1990s (Institute of Medicine, 1990). The institute reiterates this suggestion in a 
number of its later reports (Institute of Medicine, 2001; 2006). So far, at least two 






Maine was the first state to include PBC in its purchase of addiction treatment 
services. In 1992, the Maine Office of Substance Abuse launched a PBC system to 
finance all publicly funded substance abuse treatment services (Commons et al., 
1997). Under the PBC system, all programs were evaluated on post-treatment patient 
indicators within three categories: effectiveness measure (the minimum percentage of 
discharged clients who had achieved certain outcomes, such as abstinence and 
employment), efficiency measures (the units of treatment that providers had to 
deliver, such as number of clients served, number of services per client), and special 
populations (the targeted percentage of difficult clients, such as homeless people and 
youths). Each contract within the system would specify a minimum standard on each 
indicator that a contractor has to satisfy. Those contractors who failed to meet the 
minimum expectations might incur corrective actions and financial penalties.  
 
Table 2  PBC in Maine Substance Abuse Treatment Services 
 
 Outpatient Residential 
Rehabilitation 
Detoxification 
Efficiency Standards    
Minimum service delivery (percent 
of contracted amount) 
90% 80% 70% 
Minimum service delivery to 
primary clients (percent of total 
units delivered) 
70% N.A. N.A. 
    
Number to be met 2 of 2 1 of 1 1 of 1 
    
Effectiveness Standards    
Abstinence/drug free 30 days prior 
to termination 
70% 85% N.A. 
Reduction of use of primary 
substance abuse problem 
60% 85% N.A. 




Employment improvement 30% 5% N.A. 
Employability 3% 3% N.A. 
Reduction in number of problems 
with employer 
70% N.A. N.A. 
Reduction in absenteeism 50% N.A. N.A. 
Not arrested for OUI offense during 
treatment 
70% N.A. N.A. 
Not arrested for any offense 95% N.A. N.A. 
Participation in self-help during 
treatment 
40% 80% N.A. 
Reduction of problems with 
spouse/significant other 
65% 60% N.A. 
Reduction of problems with family 
members 
65% 60% N.A. 
Referral in continuum of care N.A. 90% 45% 
Referral to self-help N.A. N.A. 20% 
Time in treatment N.A. N.A. 4 days 
    
Number to be met 8 of 12 5 of 9 2 of 3 
    
Special Populations Standards    
Females 30% 40% 14% 
Age: 0-19 10% 4% 1% 
Age: 50+ 6% 5% 12% 
Corrections 25% 10% 2% 
Homeless 1% 1% 20% 
Concurrent psychological problems 8% 3% 11% 
History of IV drug use 12% 15% 27% 
Poly-drug use 35% 40% 28% 
    
Number to be met 5 of 8 5 of 8 5 of 8 
 
Note: 
1. Percentages are the minimum percent of total clients that must meet the 
indicator for the program to be deemed to have met that indicator. 
2. N.A. means that programs offering the treatment modality are not required to 
meet the indicator 
3. Number to be met is the number of indicators the program must meet to be 
deemed to have performed in that category.  
 





More recently, the Delaware Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
changed its contracting method in alcohol and other drug treatment programs from a 
FFS basis to a PBC basis in 2001. Under PBC, contractors were paid monthly based 
on their performance on three performance measures – tilization of treatment 
capacity, client participation in treatment, and client treatment completion (McLellan, 
Kemp, Brooks, & Carise, 2008; Stewart, Horgan, Garnick, Ritter, & McLellan, 2013). 
Table 3 shows the performance measures and payment schedule for the first two 
indicators. In addition, providers, after helping clients complete treatment (i.e., active 
participation in treatment for a minimum 60 days, achievement of treatment goals, 
and a minimum 4 consecutive weeks free from alcohol and illegal drugs) may receive 
$100 bonus per client. 
 
Table 3  PBC in Delaware Alcohol and Other Drug Treatment Programs 
 


















Payment: % of 
contract 
amount 
80% 90% 100 Phase 1 2 
visits/week 
50 1 
70%-79% 80%-89% 90 Phase 2 4 
visits/month 
60 1 
60%-69% 70%-79% 70 Phase 3 4 
visits/month 
70 1 




Note: treatment participation payments are conditional on achieving the capacity 
utlization requirement. Additional 1% payment when the program meets all four 
participation target. 
 







Child welfare might be the area where PBC enjoys the most attention and praise. The 
traditional fee-for-child contracting was found to undermine permanency: once a 
child welfare issue has been resolved and a child has been discharged, a contractor 
would face revenue loss unless a new child is referred. Thus, contractors may be 
inclined to keeping childs in care rather than moving them toward permanency. Since 
1990s, child welfare agencies have experimented PBC to purchase a variety of 
services, such as adoption, foster care case management, in-home services, residential 
care, and so on. In fiscal year 2008-2009, 24 states reported that their lead agencies 
include in service contracts benchmarks or indicators to measure service accessibility, 
timeliness, and service delivery efficiency (U.S. Child Care Bureau, 2008). Within 
the same time period, the Quality Improvement Center on the Privatization of Child 
Welfare Services found 14 states had service contracts that directly connect contract 
payment to performance and 11 states would consider contractor’s performance 
achievement when making future funding decisions. In 2005, the Children’s Bureau 
at the Department of Health and Human Services funded a project to test the use of 
PBC in child welfare services in Florida, Illinois, and Missouri.  
 
Table 4  State Use of PBCs in 2009 
 




States with at least one PBC that 
links payment to performance, 
most commonly in the way of 
AZ, FL, IA, ID, 
IL, MI, MN, MO, 









States using performance 
measures in contracts primarily 
to gauge contract renewal 
decisions 
AK, AR, CA, 
CO, CT, IN, LA, 




Source: The Quality Improvement Center on the Privatization of Child Welfare 
Services, 2009. 
 
However, there is a significant variance in the detailed PBC designa across states, in 
terms of performance measures, payment structures, and other dimensions. Table 5 
provides a snapshot of the current state of PBC use in some states. 
 






PBC initiated Selected performance measures 
FL Foster care  Judicial circuit 5 2007 • Earlier and more accurate data 
entry into state’s administrative 
system 
• Increased contracts with 
biological parents 
• Improved rates of maintained 




statewide 2007 • Sufficient pool of foster and 
adoptive homes 
• Children matched with 
appropriate foster homes in a 
timely manner 
• Safety in foster and adoption 
care 
IL Foster care 
case 
management 
statewide 1998 • Child safety (e.g., #of reports of 
abuse/neglect) 




placement of siblings, placement 
within community) 
• Child permanency (e.g., average 





statewide 2008 • Sustained favorable discharge 
rate 






statewide 2009 • Discharge potential rate with 
indicators of self-sufficiency 
• Transitional living placement 
stability rate 




Three regions 2005 • Reduced reentry into foster care 
• Increased stability 
• Increased permanency 
NM Adoptive and 
foster home 
licensing 
statewide 2008 • Home studies completed in a 
timely manner 
TN Foster care 
case 
management 
statewide 2007 • Average care days 
• Proportion of placements 
existing to permanency 
WY Residential 
treatment 
statewide 2006 • Reduced length of stay 
 




Mental health is one of the pioneers in human service areas that experimented PBC. 
As early as late 1970s, state mental health agencies have tentatively introduced 
performance measures into their service acquisition efforts. Wisconsin was the first 




local mental health authorities (LMHA) received a fixed budget from the state for 
community treatment and for state hospital treatment. LMHA was responsible for all 
costs incurred in the provision of services to its population. Community care costs 
were borne directly by LMHA, either through its own provision of services, or 
through the costs of contracts for the provision of services. LMHA was charged for 
state hospital use at per unit cost. Since LMHA received a fixed amount from the 
state, it received a bonus if their usage falled below this target, and a penalty for 
usage above the target (Chapin & Fetter, 2002; Gaynor, 1990). Michigan also adopted 
this model later. 
 
In fiscal years 1978-1979, the Division of Mental Health in Colorado introduced PBC 
into its mental health system (Glover & Berger, 1989; Miller & Wilson, 1981). When 
contracting with community mental health centers for mental health services, the state 
agency included several categories of performance indicators (such as number of 
admissions by age group, regular reporting of the pre- and post- outcome on all 
clients, number of severely disabled to be served, contractor’s accomplishment in 
Affirmative Action Plan) in their service contracts. At the end of the contract year, 
contractors had to report their achievement in these categories. A failure to serve 93% 
of the categorical quotas might result in a 5-7% reduce in contract funding for the 
next year. 
 
The Philadelphia mental health residential system started PBC experiment in late 




for persons with the greatest needs. Before that, service contractors were 
compensated based on the availability of residential beds. This contracting method 
was found to discourage the efficient use of resources and lead to chronically low 
occupancy levels. In 1998, the Occupancy Based Reimbursement system was 
launched, directly tying occupancy performance to financial incentives and sanctions. 
Service contractors were required to maintain annualized occupancy rate of 86% at a 
minimum to avoid financial sanctions (not exceeding the equivalent of 3% of the 
program’s yearly costs). Programs that maintained annualized occupancy levels of 
93% or higher could receive incentive funds (not exceeding the equivalent of 3% of 
the program’s yearly costs). Starting 2004, client outcome measures (e.g., graduation 




Employment training programs also have a very long history of using PBC. For 
example, employment programs funded by the Job Training Partnership Act included 
client-level performance measures in their contracts and made funding decisions 
based on performance achievements (Barnow, 2000; Heckman, Heinrich, & Smith, 
2003). The Workforce Investment Act (WIA), JTPA’s successor as the primary 
federal training program, adopted an expanded version of the JTPA performance 
system. Besides, Wisconsin transferred its Wisconsin Works (W-2) contracts from a 
cost-reimbursement basis to a PBC basis in 1997, tying contract payment to measured 




Contractors who failed to meet basic performance standards might lose future 
contracts, while capable contactors would enjoy profits or bonuses (Heinrich & Choi, 
2007) . 
 
Particularly, employment services for disabled people within state vocational 
rehabilitation programs are increasingly using PBC in the purchase of various 
services from contractors. Since Oklahoma designed and used the milestone payment 
system (one version of PBC) in 1990s, many other states such as Alabama, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, and New York have followed the lead (O’Brien & Revell, 2005). The 
details of state vocational rehabilitation programs and their PBC models in 
employment service contracting will be presented in depth in chapter four. 
 
2.3  Important but Missing Links  
 
Despite the burgeoning popularity in the use of PBC to purchase human services, 
there is not much documented evidence on the effectiveness of PBC. Specifically, 
two critical issues related to the use of PBC in human services remain unclear: (1) 
whether PBC produces better results than fee-for-service contracting – the 
effectiveness problem, and (2) if so, under what conditions, or how to use or 







Ironically, to date, there is still little empirical evidence supporting that PBC actually 
leads to performance improvement in human services in a systematic way. The 
current prevalence of PBC in the purchase of human services is largely driven by the 
underlying theoretical reasoning behind PBC and the fashion of PBC in other fields. 
The theoretical reasoning of PBC is tempting: attaching contract compensations to 
service outcome measures could motivate better outcomes and empowering 
contractors could encourage innovative and quality services. The effectiveness of 
PBC in other fields such as energy further makes PBC attractive to human service 
agencies. For example, the federal government conducted a performance-based 
service contracting pilot project in 1998 and found a 15% decrease in contract prices 
and a 18% improvement in customer satisfaction (OFPP, 2003). However, current fad 
of PBC in human services often ignores the distinct characteristics human services 
possess and the special challenges those features bring to PBC. The discussion on this 
point is relatively brief here; a more detailed theoretical elaboration will be found in 
the next chapter. 
 
The foremost precondition of PBC is the inclusion of performance measures. Any 
performance-based management tool requires a set of performance standards and 
metrics against which success could be measured. However, developing 
comprehensive and quantifiable measures that could cover the full spectrum of 
human service performance has long been considered very tough, if possible. First, 
human service programs frequently pursue values or goals that are multi-dimensional 
and often competing, which makes the design of appropriate measures that could 




Heinrich & Fournier, 2004). Second, human service outcomes cannot easily be 
attributed to particular interventions and the confounding factors would contribute to 
the ambiguity of outcomes. Third, most human service programs aim to promote 
long-term stability and positive quality-of-life changes, but performance measures in 
service contracts have to emphasize short-term effects within certain contract 
duration. As a result, public managers have to use intermediate outcomes to account 
for final outcomes (Martin & Kettner, 1996). In short, all these elements jointly imply 
that performance measures for human services are often biased.  
 
In addition to the problem of ambiguous performance, human services also feature 
high provider discretion in service delivery process. Human service provision is 
highly labor intensive, making the exercise of discretionary judgments by service 
providers inevitable or even desired (Lipsky, 1980; Riccucci, 2005; Sandfort, 2000). 
The line staff, through direct interactions with clients, can determine the “range of 
behavioral actions from which clients may choose their responses” (Lipsky, 1980, 
61). Thus, such discretion constitutes part of service providers’ daily work, actually 
playing a double-edged role. On one side, it can help providers “process” clients in a 
responsive way, tailoring services to different client situations. On the other hand, 
there is a risk that such discretion might be abused without justification.  
 
In sum, the rise of PBC in human services represents the convergence of imperfect 
performance measures and high provider discretion. Combining these two together, 




A, while hoping for B” (Kerr, 1975). Relying on imperfect surrogate measures leaves 
service contractors room to “gaming,” while higher provider discretion granted by 
PBC helps contractors achieve these potential gains (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Bohte & 
Meier, 2000; Heckman, Heinrich, & Smith, 1997; Moynihan, 2011). For example, in 
serveal human service areas, when contract payments are tied to clients’ outcome 
achievement, contractors are likely to selcect clients and serve those who are easier to 
meet performnace goals. Thus, PBC creates much potential for service contractors to 
“gaming” or “creaming,” by focusing services on the variable measured, while 
excluding other outcomes which may be equally important but more difficult to 
measure. As Radin (2006) suggests, “because various players are likely to use the 
information to meet their varied agendas, it is rational for those who are the subject of 
the data to find ways to game the system” (207-208).  
 
Actually, current evidence on the effectiveness of PBC in human services, though 
limited and unsystematic, has already been quite mixed. Table 6 demonstrates some 
of these studies. The introduction of PBC into substance abuse treatment programs 
has attracted strong scholarly interest in examining various aspect of its effectiveness. 
Commons, McGuire, and Riordan (1997) compare the client-level changes before and 
after the use of PBC in Maine and observe positive improvement in service outcomes, 
such as abstinence, reduction in drug use, reduction in problems with jobs, and no 
arrests. However, this finding was largely doubted by later studies in that it fails to 
consider the unintended effects incurred by PBC. Shen (2003) finds that, after the 




clients dropped by 7% and concludes that PBC actually equips contractors with 
financial incentives to treat less severe clients to achieve targeted performance. Lu 
(1999) argues that since state agency relied on contractors to report client treatment 
outcomes, contractors had incentives to misreport and cheat on performance 
information to ensure funding from state government. Brucker and Stewart (2011) 
reexamine Maine’s experience and conclude that PBC had no positive effect on 
program performance such as time to treatment, level of client participation, length of 
stay, and completion of treatment. In Delaware, McLellan et al. (2008) find 
significant increases in average capacity utilization (from 54% to 95%) and average 
proportion of patients’ meeting participation requirement (from 53% to 70%) after 
PBC implementation, with no notable demographic changes in the patient population 
over time. Building on this finding, Stewart et al. (2013) further trace the 
effectiveness of PBC on individual clients and observe 13 days less in waiting time 
for treatment and 22 days longer in length of stay in treatment. 
 
In employment services, the effectiveness of PBC in the programs funded by the Job 
Training Partnership Act has been found to be very controversial. The use of short-
term and straightforward measures is only weakly, and sometimes perversely, 
associated with long-term welfare (Barnow, 2000; Heckman et al., 2003; Heinrich, 
1999). Dias and Maynard-Moody (2006) study workers in a for-profit subsidiary of a 
national marketing research firm that shifted into the business of providing welfare 
services. They find requirements for meeting contract performance (job placement) 




importance of meeting performance goals versus meeting client needs. The easiest 
way to meet contract goals and gain profits was to minimize the time and effort 
devoted to each client. Koning and Heinrich (2013) examine the incentive effects of 
PBC on program outcomes in Dutch welfare-to-work program. They find evidence of 
gaming activities, but these activities had little impact of gaming on service 
outcomes. They conclude that the use of PBC increased job placement, but not job 
duration.  
 
In other human service areas, the effectiveness puzzle remains. Many evaluations of 
PBC in child welfare are still underway. In particular, Illinois used PBC to promote 
permanency outcomes in its foster care contracting and witnessed a significant 
decrease in the number of children in out-of-home placement (Kearney, McEwen, 
Bloom-Ellis, & Jordan, 2010). After Philadelphia directly tied financial incentives 
and sanctions to occupancy performance, the mental health residential system 
witnessed a significant increase in occupancy, with an average occupancy rate of mid 
90%. However, there was still a concern that the performance target on occupancy 
may suppress the flow of residents through the housing system (Faith et al., 2010). 
 
Table 6.  Selected Studies on PBC Effectiveness in Human Services 
 








Maine Substance abuse 
treatment services 
Client • Improvement in service 
outcomes, such as abstinence, 
reduction in drug use, reduction in 
problems with jobs, and no arrests 
Lu (1999) Maine Substance abuse 
treatment services 
Client • Providers had incentives to report 





Heinrich (1999) Chicago JTPA programs Program • Performance measures were not 
strongly correlated with program 
goals 
• Cost-per-placement measure had 
negative implications for service 
quality 
Shen (2003) Maine Substance abuse 
treatment services 
Client • Number of most severe clients 
dropped by 7%  
Lu, Albert Ma, 
and Yuan 
(2003) 
Maine Substance abuse 
treatment services 
Client • More referrals and better match 
between illness severity and 
treatment intensity 
• A positive but insignificant effect 
on dumping (a client is 
sequentially referred from one 







JTPA programs Client • Short-term measures were 
weakly, even perversely, related 
to long-term impacts 
• Efficiency gains or losses from 









• Distorted incentive structures that 
led to programmatic conflicts 
between program management 
and staff 
• Negative program practice and 
poor client outcome 
Heinrich and 
Choi (2007) 
Wisconsin Wisconsin Works 
(W-2) program 
Program • Contractors responded to 
performance incentives related to 
future funding decisions 
• Insufficient contacting 






Delaware  Outpatient 
alcohol and other 
drug treatment 
Program  • Average capacity utilization rates 
increased from 54% to 95% 
• Average proportion of patients’ 




increased from 53% to 70% 
Faith et al. 
(2010) 
Philadelphia mental health 
residential 
services 
Program • Significant increases in program 
occupancy 
• The flow of residents through the 







Delaware  Outpatient 
alcohol and other 
drug treatment 
Client  • Waiting time for treatment 
declined 13 days 
• Length of stay in treatment 





Client • Evidence of gaming activities 
• Little impact of gaming on service 
outcomes 
 
Overall, current research on the effectiveness of PBC in human services mostly 
suffers from two limitations. First, many studies fail to count in the impact of 
unintended consequences of PBC on full service performance. As mentioned above, 
developing a series of performance measures that could capture full service 
performance is very challenging. Thus a common strategy is to use short-term and 
easy-to-measure indicators instead. As such, contractor efforts in achieving measured 
performance may affect their behaviors related to unmeasured performance. For 
example, the performance improvement in Maine substance abuse treatment 
programs was very likely to be attained though custom selection and contractor 
misreporting. Such performance improvement, though efficient to some extent, 
should not be considered effective. More broadly, if improvement in measured 
performance is achieved at the expense of other unmeasured performance, such 
improvement is not effective and desired. A systematic evaluation of PBC 
effectiveness should include such consideration. Without it, the evaluation is 





Second, methodologically, these evaluation studies often rely on “pre-post” 
comparisons based on observation data. The most severe threat to internal validity in 
observation studies in that observations in comparison groups are biased by 
counterfactual variables, which are not directly comparable. The “pre-post” 
comparison, as the most basic quasi-experimental design, is very unlikely to rule out 
the effect of these counterfactual variables (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Thus, 
the results from pre-post comparisons generally suffer from low internal validity. In 




Closely related to the effectiveness of PBC is the capacity challenge. As discussed 
previously, PBC is experimented in and introduced to service contracting as an effort 
to address the smart-buyer problem, i.e., public managers are sometimes not equipped 
with sufficient management capacity to use contracting effectively. However, 
although the potential benefits of PBC are attractive, the launch of PBC system does 
not guarantee the achievement of those benefits. Rather, PBC itself creates a series of 
new challenges for public managers in designing and implementing PBC systems, 
such as how to set performance milestones and indicators, how to split 
responsibilities and risks bewteen contracting parties, how to conduct performance 
monitoring, etc. After reviewing the use of PBC in federal agencies, GAO (2002) 




based contracting and how to take full advantage of it” (2). New York State piloted 
PBC in its employment services for disabled people in early 2000s and soon 
abandoned the effort when the administration found they lacked the capacity to 
implement PBC and lead organizational change (Gates et al., 2004). Heinrich and 
Choi (2007) admit that insufficient program administration and contracting 
management capacity undermined the effectiveness of PBC in Wisconsin Works 
program.     
 
Basically, the introduction of PBC requires two managerial capacities: designing 
appropriate PBC systems and implementing organizational changes. First, the critical 
role of performance measures could not be emphasized more. As is shown previously, 
there are many variations in performance measures among the PBC models currently 
used in different states, even in the same human service field. Appropriate 
performance measurement facilitates PBC implementation and reduces the potential 
of unintended consequences. This further implies several more detailed tasks, such as 
which part of performance to track and how to link contract reimbursement to client 
outcomes. 
 
In addition to these technical aspects of PBC design, a more profound capacity would 
be leading organizational innovation and changes in an inter-organizational setting. 
Given the difficulty of designing comprehensive measurement systems for human 
services, this capacity becomes even more critical. Under PBC, only service efforts 




forces contractors to burden substantial fiscal risks. Contractors are exposed to loss 
when their service efforts do not result in expected outcomes. Such risk shifting 
complicates contract implementation. Romzek and Johnston’s (2002) study of service 
contracting in Kansas finds that although accurate performance measures in 
contracting may facilitate contract implementation, substantial risks at the contractor 
side would “compromise the capacity of the contractor both to meet performance 
expectations and to provide required performance information to contract managers” 
(430). McGrew et al. (2007) observe that contractors do prefer FFS over PBC, 
although they mostly welcome the freedom in the service process under PBC. In this 
sense, it is likely that contractors resist the transition from traditional FFS approach to 
PBC, or only perversely adjust to PBC systems.  
 
Moreover, the injection of PBC to human service system is an evolving process, 
allowing longtime trial-and-error. The movement toward PBC takes patient and 
deliberate effort and needs to address a myriad of challenges. It is an evolutionary 
rather than a revolutionary process, which requires years’ planning with progressive 
implementation and is expected to continue evolving over time. For example, over a 
6-year period, the Philadelphia mental health system was able to shift from a FFS 
model to a PBC model. Even though the basic PBC framework had been there, the 
administration was still modifying and improving the performance measures (Faith et 
al., 2010). Particular, it takes a great deal of time to establish a meaningful 
performance measurement system that informs program development and client 




Heinrich and Marschke (2010) argue, “an incentive designers’ understanding of the 
nature of a performance measure’s distortions and employees’ means for influencing 
performance is typically imperfect prior to implementation,” and thus “it is only as 
performance measures are tried, evaluated, modified, and/or discarded that agents’ 
responses become known” (203). All these imply that PBC should be treated as a 
learning process for public managers. 
 
In sum, governments at all levels have shown substantial and continuous enthusiasm 
for PBC. In human services, particularly, state and local governments have expressed 
growing interests in using PBC in their service acquisition. Although the designs of 
detailed PBC systems in different states and different service areas might vary, the 
basic motivation of the injection of PBC is the same: align human service systems’ 
focus on outcomes with how services are financed, or more technically, reshape 
contractor behaviors through redefining contract incentive structures. However, the 
burgeoning popularity of PBC lacks sufficient evidence to show its promised benefits 
are actually achievable. The evidence available in this regard still fails to provide a 
consistent and persuasive answer. 
 
To an extent, the introduction of PBC into human service systems, from a managerial 
perspective, needs to address the effectiveness problem (whether PBC produces better 
results) and the capacity problem (how to use PBC and lead interorganizational 
changes). The present reasearch mainly focuses on the effectiveness problem, but 




research needs a theoretical framework that could pave the way for future discussion. 
This is the topic of the chapter three: a theoretical discussion of contract design and 







Chapter 3.  Theoretical Framework  
 
3.1  Formal Contract Design: A Principal-agent Perspective 
 
The same as much previous literature on government contracting (e.g., Donahue, 
1989; Johnston & Romzek, 1999; Kettl, 1993; Milward & Provan, 1998, 2000; 
Romzek & Johnston, 2005), this research puts the discussion of contract design first 
in a principal-agent model (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shapiro, 
2005), where government (the principal) relies on contractors (the agents) to deliver 
human services and achieve policy goals. Based on the assumptions of goal conflicts 
and information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, the agency theory 
warns the existence of agency problem, i.e., the principal is subject to the agent’s self-
serving opportunistic behaviors. First, because of incomplete information, the 
principal could not verify the agent’s capacity and thus may rely on low-quality 
agents. In this sense, it is the agent that chooses the principal, not the opposite. This is 
termed as adverse selection or hidden information (Arrow, 1984). Moreover, the 
agent may further take the information advantage to shirk his/her responsibility and 
not put forth the agreed-upon efforts. This hidden action (Arrow, 1984) would 
generate considerable moral hazard for the principal.  
 
To address the agency problem, the principal might try a variety of monitoring tools 
to bridge information asymmetries and goal conflicts. However, all these efforts 




focuses on the design of efficient governance mechanisms to moderate the agency 
problem, or more precisely, appropriate control mechanisms to guide the distribution 
of risk and uncertainty between the principal and the agent. If organizational control 
is seen as a problem of information flow (Ouchi & Maguire, 1975), the design of 
control mechanisms and strategies within an organization largely rests upon two 
dimensions: (1) task programmability – the degree to which the means-ends 
relationships involved in agent behaviors can be precisely defined, and (2) outcome 
measurability – the extent to which various aspects of task outcomes could be 
specified in a comprehensive and quantifiable manner. The focus of control, 
therefore, can be on either the behavior of employees or the outcomes of those 
behaviors. Accordingly, the control strategy can be either behavior or outcome based 
(Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1980; Thompson, 1967).  
 
Generally, behavior-based control is appropriate in an environment characterized by 
high task programmability. When certainty regarding causation is high, control 
strategies are more reflected in high levels of monitoring and direction in agent 
activities, with performance evaluation often focusing on job inputs. If outcome 
measurability is high, organizations would prefer outcome-based control strategies, 
under which compensation schemes are attached to outcome measures and 
monitoring of employees becomes relative less. When a task is neither programmed 
nor measured, formal control mechanisms, both behavior-based and outcome based, 
seem ineffective in that there is no exact place to host the control. In this case, social 




supplemental role. The social control system, using informal and normative 
mechanisms (such as shared values and norms of reciprocity) to align the preferences 
between the principal and the agent, implicitly encourages appropriate behaviors that 
could lead to desirable organizational outcomes. 
 
Table 7.  The Determinants of Organizational Control Strategies 
 




High Behavior or outcome 
control 
Outcome control 
Low Behavior control “Clan” control 
 
Source: Ouchi (1980). 
 
Arrow (1964) defines the design of control strategies as the choice of operating rules 
and the choice of enforcement rules to support the operating rules. If an organization 
operates “as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals” (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976, 310), then the design of optimal contract arrangement governing 
the principal-agent relationship constitutes the enforcement rule to facilitate contract 
implementation. In accordance with two types of organizational controls, there are 
two major contract alternatives: behavior-based and outcome-based contracts. The 
choice of a contract type is thus a function of task programmability and outcome 
measurability. The key in structuring contractual relationships, writes Eisenhardt 
(1989), is “the trade-off between (a) the cost of measuring behavior and (b) the cost 





Figure 3 describes four types of goods and services in terms of their certainty in 
causation and outcome and different contract types tailored to fit these characteristics.  
 
Figure 3.  The Determinants of Contract Type 
 
 
For services in Cell 2, the means-ends relationships involved in agent services can be 
explicitly specified and observed. As such, information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent in terms of task programmability is low and the risk 
transferred from the agent to the principal becomes expensive. Therefore, the 
principal knows what the agent has done and could under behavior-oriented contracts 
to purchase the agent’s direct behaviors. In Cell 3, agent services are ambiguous to 
observe, but their outcomes could be clearly measured with less difficulty. Under 
these circumstances, the principal would prefer outcome-based contracts to align the 
agent’s incentives with those of the principal and make risk shifting from the agent to 
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are highly certain (in Cell 4), there is no difference for the principal to control either 
service process or outcome, and thus both contract types work equally well.  
 
The most problematic situation for contract design comes from the services in Cell 1, 
where agent services share both low task programmability and low outcome 
measurability. In health care, for example, the principal lacks the ability to anticipate 
clearly the treatment process and outcomes. As such, the locus of control for the 
principal seems obscure, leaving a high degree of incompleteness in contract 
specification. When the control the principal uses to govern the contractual 
relationships is incomplete, as incomplete contract theory (Hart, 1988; 1989) predicts, 
the agent would enjoy “residual rights of control” and be at the advantageous position 
in ex post bargaining and the division of ex post benefits. In most cases, the agent 
could perform discretionary judgments in the circumstances that were not specified in 
initial contracts. These behaviors are very likely to incur moral hazard. In short, the 
incompleteness in task programmability and outcome measurability would make 
contract design challenging. Unfortunately, this is where human services usually fit 
in.       
 
3.2  Formal Contract Design for Human Services 
 
Human services generally feature low task programmability and low outcome 
measurability. The effort on task programmability in human services is always 
disturbed by high provider discretion in the service delivery process. Human service 




service providers inevitable or even desired (Lipsky, 1980; Riccucci, 2005; Sandfort, 
2000). Although there are various operating rules and service manuals throughout thr 
service process, in real situations service providers are always required to apply their 
judgment and make decisions contingent on detailed contexts. These line staff, 
through direct interactions with clients, can determine the “range of behavioral 
actions from which clients may choose their responses” (Lipsky, 1980, 61). Thus, 
typically, service providers “do not do just what they want or just what they are told 
to want. They do what they can” (Brodkin, 1997, 24). Thus, such discretion 
constitutes part of service providers’ daily work, actually playing a double-edged 
role. On one side, it can help providers “process” clients in a responsive way, 
tailoring services to different clients. On the other hand, it may abuse such rights 
without justification. Sandfort (2000) examines the potential influence of the new 
public management and traditional public administrative practices on front-line 
actions in two local welfare offices and two private contractors in Michigan. She 
finds that neither performance-based management nor traditional bureaucratic 
directives have an impact on front-line practices in either type of agency. Instead, the 
most powerful determinants of street-level behaviors rest upon the collective beliefs 
of front-line staff, such as norms, shared knowledge of the organizational members. 
 
In addition, the outcome of human services is often too uncertain to be defined 
clearly. Measuring the performance of human service programs has long been 
considered demanding. First, from the normative perspective, like many other public 




dimensional and often competing, such as efficiency, equity, and representativeness, 
derived from the various expectations on government cherished by citizens. Wilson 
(2000) details this multidimensional nature and the dilemma of balancing them. At 
the very basic level, public welfare programs are always involved in the efficiency-
equity puzzle, recognized by Okun (1975) as “the big tradeoff.” Thus, the answers to 
the question of “what to measure” are always ambiguous and competing. As such, 
figuring out appropriate measures that could comprehensively cover the full range of 
the missions and values can be difficult (Behn, 2003; Heinrich & Fournier, 2004; 
Heckman, Heinrich, & Smith, 1997). 
 
Second, technically, human services are directed to improving service recipients’ 
welfare through behavioral interventions. As Hasenfeld (1983) observes, human 
services aim to “protect, maintain, or enhance the personal well-being of individuals 
by defining, shaping, or altering their personal attributes” (1). However, beyond such 
interventions, there might be a number of uncontrollable factors out of service 
providers’ reach that would lower the certainty of desired outcomes (DeHoog & 
Salamon, 2002; Martin & Kettner, 1996; Wedel & Conston, 1988). Thus, outcomes 
cannot easily be attributed to a particular intervention. Also, the standards on 
significant changes in welfare conditions before and after services are sometime 
controversial. 
 
Third, most human service programs aim to promote long-term stability and welfare, 




over time is a costly activity and does not produce short-term feedback on the success 
of the program. Most programs use outcomes of participants measured at the time 
they complete the program, or within a short period thereafter (Martin & Kettner, 
1996). Both measures are short-term in nature, which creates another puzzle that 
these performance standards misdirect activities by focusing on the criteria that may 
be not related to long-term goals. Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002) find that in 
the JTPA system, short-term measures used to monitor performance were only 
weakly, even perversely, related to long-term impacts. Putting these three points 
together, we could have some understanding on why performance measurement in 
human service programs is so difficult. 
 
With these intrinsic characteristics of human services in mind, let’s move onto the 
discussion of contract design. Traditionally, human service contracts run on a fee-for-
service basis, a behavior-based contract, where government directly controls the 
service process (such as inputs standards and service methods employed) in order to 
ensure the delivery of promised services. When a client comes to a human service 
agency for services, agency staff would determine the eligibility and prescribe the 
amount of services needed. After that, the human service agency buys this amount of 
services from service contractors. For example, a human service agency may 
purchase individual counseling services for a domestic violence offender at the rate of 
$75 per hour, or group counseling in outpatient substance abuse treatment at $20 per 




service contractors are reimbursed for that amount of services delivered, based on the 
unit of services (e.g., per hour or per 15 minutes). 
 
However, the task programmability of a human service is always tentative – it is 
difficult to predict initially what services could exactly lead to desired results due to 
ambiguous jobs and uncertain future events. Thus, government effort on task 
programmability under FFS might be offset by the discretion contractors enjoy in the 
service delivery process because they work directly with clients and have (or pretend 
to have) more information on clients’ service needs. And the negotiation nature of 
human service contracting may further justify the existence of discretion. As DeHoog 
(1990) observes, human service contracting generally follows a special negotiation or 
cooperation logic. Due to limited market competition, ambiguous performance, and 
costly contracting monitoring (DeHoog, 1984; Schlesinger, Dorwart, & Pulice, 1986; 
Van Slyke, 2003), human service contracting does not usually rely on the classical 
competitive bidding model. Rather, human service contracts are mostly specified 
through negotiations between government buyers and contractors. This would no 
doubt complicate government effort on task programmability. 
 
Another byproduct of low programmability of human services is that the link between 
task and outcome becomes broken: due to failure of clear task specification, the 
detailed services prescribed by government do not necessarily lead to desired 
outcomes. In this sense, contract compensation, independent of service outcomes, 




(Kettner & Martin, 1993, 62). Given this, contractors have no incentive to improve 
service performance. Further, better performance may even mean economical 
inefficiency for them (Wulczyn, 2005). For example, improving service quality 
increases contractor costs for advanced facilities and staff training, which would not 
be reimbursed by government. Again, better services reduce client demands for 
feature services.  
 
The new PBC approach, holding an outcome orientation, draws contractors toward 
service results and leaves them considerable flexibility in serving clients. 
Theoretically, PBC would encourage innovative services, better outcomes, and less 
monitoring. However, these benefits are subject to two assumptions—PBC is not 
vulnerable to (1) measurement problem and (2) gaming by contractors (Behn & Kant, 
1999; Bevan & Hood, 2006). Without meeting these two requirements, the 
effectiveness of PBC cannot be guaranteed. 
 
As mentioned above, the performance of human service programs is very challenging 
to track. In most cases, performance measures for human services are often just 
approximations of the targeted outcomes, i.e., short-term measures representing long-
term effects and easy-to-measure goals representing ambiguous goals. As a result, the 
measurement assumption becomes problematic in human service contracting. 
However, when surrogate measures are used, as mentioned earlier, service contracts 
become incomplete, leaving room for contractors to seek gaming and other strategic 




contracting depends on the extent to which the performance measures used are 
aligned with the principal’s objective. When the principal’s objective is not 
contractible, i.e., unclear or immeasurable, alternative measures have to be adopted as 
proxies. If so, the incentives associated with those performance measures are 
inaccurate and nonoptimal, leading contractors to engage in unintended activities 
even if contractors are risk neutral. The more distortion is in performance measures, 
the lower is the incentive for desired objectives.  
 
Indeed, such distortion becomes even severer when gaming enters the picture. As 
noted above, service contractors embrace discretion when delivering services and 
PBC even enhances such discretion. Thus, it is very likely that contractors use their 
information advantage to conduct perverse adjustment to performance measures in 
order to appear to be behaving well (Hood, 2006; Courty & Marschke, 2004; 
Moynihan, 2008; Radin, 2006). Williamson (1985) terms this phenomenon as 
opportunism, a “self-interest seeking with guile” (47), which includes a wide range of 
behaviors, such as shirking, cheating, and withholding important information. Bevan 
and Hood (2006) summarize three forms of gaming problem under PBC context—
ratchet effects (restricting current output to gain undemanding future performance 
target), threshold effects (downgrading the output of those performing better than the 
target to meet the target), and output distortions (achieving targeted performance 
measures at the expense of unmeasured performance). All would limit the 





Almost two decades ago, Cragg (1997) questioned why PBC was not prevalent in 
human service programs. After examining the practices of PBC in job training 
programs under JTPA, he concluded “unless performance standards are carefully 
designed, problems of moral hazard may preclude the widespread use of performance 
incentives in government programs” (147). Although performance measurement 
techniques have been improved greatly since Cragg’s study, the problem he observed 
may persist as long as ambiguous performance and high discretion associated with 
human services continue. By and large, neither behavior-oriented nor outcome-
oriented contracts fit seamlessly with human services (Table 8). Both might incur 
certain amount of agency costs in structuring and monitoring contractual 
relationships, which would further undermine the effectiveness of formal contact 
design.  
 
Table 8.  Contract Type for Human Service Contracting 
 
 Fee-for-service Contracting Performance-based Contracting 
Control Strategy Behavior-based control Outcome-based control 
Implementation problem Low task programmability Low outcome measurability 





3.3  Informal Contract Design: A Relational Contracting Perspective 
 
Another line of literature that would cast light on the discussion here is relational 
contracting. Interorganizational relationships (IORs) always embrace two dimensions, 




(Faems, Janssens, Madhok, & Van Looy, 2008; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). The 
structural perspective considers a formal structural arrangement and its role in 
structuring interorganizational behaviors and performance, in order to “create a 
predictable collaborative environment that mitigates exchange hazards and facilitates 
coordinated action” (Faems et al., 2008, 1054). The relational perspective emphasizes 
informal relationship building, trust cultivation, and trustworthy behaviors. Thus, it 
“promotes a more relational governance strategy in which partners rely on trust to 
address issues of safeguarding and coordination” (Faems et al., 2008, 1054). This 
dichotomy actually follows the conventional wisdom of the interaction between 
formal and informal behaviors in organizational management. 
 
Following this line of reasoning, formal contracting centers on “detailed, binding 
legal agreements that specify the obligations and roles of both parties in the 
relationship” (Vandaele et al. 2007, 240). In this most visible part of a contract, the 
attention would be on the design of comprehensive contract clauses to bind future 
contingencies. In this sense, contracting basically means two elements: “(a) rational 
planning of the transaction with careful provision or as many future contingencies as 
can be foreseen, and (b) the existence or use of actual or potential legal sanctions to 
induce performance of the exchange or to compensate for non-performance” 
(Macaulay, 1963, 56). Thus, the designs of formal contracts aim to reduce 





In contrast, relational contracting literature questions the gap between contract 
doctrine and the empirical operation of the contract system in the real world. 
Organizations engaged in contracting often do not need to conduct rational contract 
planning and negotiation when the transactions are run within a setting of continuing 
relationships. Potential disputes are compromised in the way of keeping the 
relationship continues. The contracting process, as Macaulay (1985) argues, is not “a 
neutral application of abstract rationality,” but “operates at the margins of major 
systems of private government through institutionalized social structures and less 
formal social fields” (477). Underlying this observation is the notion of relational 
contracting, a type of contracting that reflects “the relations among parties to the 
process of projecting exchange into the future” (Macneil, 1980, 4). It can be seen as a 
logical extension of the bounded rationality represented by formal contracting. This 
line of research (Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1977) highlights the role of relational 
sanction and social interaction in understanding the incentives under the fulfillment of 
contractual agreements.  A detailed comparison between formal and relational 
contracting is listed below in Table 9. 
 
Table 9.  Comparisons between Formal and Relational Contracting 
 
 Formal Contracting Relational Contracting 
Perspectives about 
relations with vendors 
• Anticipate short-term 
relationship 
• Low risk/low trust 
• No expectation for 
altruistic behavior 
• Anticipate long-term 
relationship, seek out 
trustworthy partners 
• High risk/trust 
• Expect altruistic 
behavior in the interest 




Market assumptions • Many vendors available • Few potential vendors 
Contract writing • Detailed specification of 
benefits, burdens, rules, 
and rights 
• Monitoring for 
compliance 




with anticipation of 
adapting to changing 
circumstances 
• Social norms serve as 
principal mechanisms of 
mediation or control 
• Aversion to third-party, 
legal remedies 
Management style • Sanctions imposed as 
written 
• Low levels of contacts 
and coordination 
• Compliance as a key 
concern 
• Sanctions and remedies 
not imposed but rather 
negotiated and mediated 
• Flexibility, solidarity, 
information sharing 
• Maintenance of 




• Easy to define service 
tasks 
• Easy to evaluate service 
quality and vendor 
performance 
• Tasks do not require 





• Ambiguity in defining 
service tasks 
• Difficult to assess 
service quality and 
vendor performance 
• Vendors are required to 
make special investments 
to satisfy buyers’ 
customized needs 
 




This relational exchange perspective in contracting management has actually received 
growing attention in public management literature (e.g., Brown, Potoski, & Van 




stewardship theory to explain public service contracting (e.g., Dicke, 2002; 
Lambright, 2009; Van Slyke, 2007). Stewardship theory emphasizes the cooperation 
and trust nature in principal- agent relationships. As Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson 
(1997) suggest, it “defines situations in which managers are not motivated by 
individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motivates are aligned with the 
objectives of their principals” (21). Stewardship theory becomes more relevant to 
government-nonprofit contracting, in which nonprofits are always believed to be 
social-mission driven and have weaker incentives to take advantage of asymmetric 
information in market exchange. Such mission/value alignment with government 
would moderate goal conflicts between contracting parties and prevent nonprofit 
contractors’ opportunistic behaviors in maximizing their financial interest and market 
value. 
 
Indeed, relational contracting has special implications for service contracting. First, 
human service contracting has been found to follow a negotiation model, rather than 
the competitive bidding model proposed by the privatization literature, due to limited 
market competition, ambiguous performance, and costly monitoring (DeHoog, 1991; 
Johnston & Romzek, 1999; Sclar, 2000; Van Slyke, 2003). In this sense, informal 
social exchanges between contracting parties would play a significant role. Romzek 
and Johnston (2002) find that in Kansas social service programs, ongoing 
“negotiation and collaboration among contracting partners” (423) is necessary for 
effective contract implementation. Brown and Potoski (2004) show that even in 




competition is rich, public managers still engage in a variety of informal network 
activities (such as hosting informal meetings with contractors and attending 
professional conferences) to promote competition and reduce information 
asymmetries. 
 
Second, as mentioned earlier, human service contracting is always troubled by low 
task programmability and low outcome measurability, which complicates the design 
of formal contract arrangement. As such, social control, or what Ouchi (1979) calls 
“clan” control, may emerge to function as a supplement. The existence of informal 
socialization process against organizational rationality in organizational operation has 
been long acknowledged since the Hawthorne Studies. The social control system, 
using informal and normative mechanisms (such as shared values and norm of 
reciprocity) to eliminate interest and goal incongruence between the principal and the 
agent, implicitly encourages appropriate behaviors that could lead to desirable 
collaborative outcomes. Put together, the arguments here call for the inclusion of 
relational aspects of contracting, in addition to formal contracting endeavor. 
 
However, the interaction between formal and relational components of contracting is 
still under scholarly debate: whether formal and relational contracting could function 
as mutually competing or enhancing mechanisms. The mutual exclusion view 
considers a hostile relationship between formal and informal contracting. From this 
perspective, efforts on legal maneuvers in formal contracts as safeguards against 




building between organizations (Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; Ghoshal and Moran 
1996; Lyons and Mehta, 1997). However, the complementary-role perspective 
challenges this view. Poppo and Zenger (2002) and Goo et al. (2009) find that clear 
contract specification reduces risk in cooperation, which would promote repeated 
exchanges and further result in mutual dependence and trust. And trust emerging 
from prior collaborations would substitute for more elaborate formal contract 
provisions (Gulati, 1995). Informal relationship and mutual understanding could 
mitigate ex post informal flow and coordination, reducing the need for clear 
specifications (Dore, 1983; Zollo et al. 2002). Sclar (2000) even argues with 
relational contracting, “the formal contract or agreement is less important as a 
reference point for dispute resolution than is the quality of trust between the 
organizations” (123). Different from all these studies, Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand 
and Nooteboom (2005), through comparative case studies of four inter-firm 
relationships, find that the relationship between formal and informal contracting is so 
complex and dynamic that they can be both complements and substitutes, largely 
dependent on managerial contexts. 
 
In public management literature, the empirical research on whether formal 
contracting and relational contracting are substitutes or complements is still less 
common. Van Slyke (2006) finds through interviews with public and nonprofit 
managers that social service contracting management might evolve from more 
formal-contracting like to more relational-contracting like over time. Lambright 




principal-agent perspective (formal contracting) and stewardship perspective 
(relational contracting). She concludes neither one could explain the entire story. 
Lamothe and Lamothe (2012) confirm this argument and find that in local service 
delivery, there are substantial contact and communicate between public managers and 
their vendors in contract implementation, in addition to clearly written formal 
contracts. Put together, the evidence so far points to the coexistence of these two 
mechanisms that public managers would devote themselves to simultaneously. To 
some extent, such combination of formal and informal contracting reflects the nature 
of contracting management in public administration context: well-planned and written 
contracts to meet the formal accountability demand, and negotiation and discretion to 
satisfy the flexibility concerns in service delivery (DeHoog, 1990). 
 
In sum, this chapter provides a theoretical framework of contract design for human 
services. Holding a principal-agent perspective, this chapter first argues that formal 
contract design depends on two dimensions: task programmability and outcome 
measurability of the contracted services, which further lead to two contract 
arrangements: behavior-based contracts and outcome-based contracts. However, 
given that human services share both low task programmability (due to high provider 
discretion) and low outcome measurability (due to multidimensional, long-term 
outcomes), neither formal contract arrangements might fit seamlessly with human 
services. To provide a balanced theoretical framework, this chapter also includes the 
literature on relational contracting, which implies the reliance on relational exchange 




formal and informal contracting literature provides a complete framework to study 
contracting management. With this theoretical framework in mind, this project turns 
to the discussion of vocational rehabilitation, a human service area where PBC is 
becoming increasingly prevalent, as a policy field of inquiry for this present research. 
Particularly, Indiana vocational rehabilitation program’s transition from FFS to PBC 
in the purchase of VR employment services provides a good case to answer the PBC 




































Chapter 4. Vocational Rehabilitation as a Policy Field 
 
4.1  Vocational Rehabilitation Programs 
 
In the United States, 56.7 million American had a disability in 2010, representing 
18.7 percent of the population. Among them, about 41 percent of those aged 21 to 64 
with a disability were employed2. Employment has been found to be fundamental to 
people’s physical and psychological well-being (Dooley, Fielding, & Levi, 1996; 
Linn, Sandifer, & Stein, 1985; Paul & Moser, 2009). Employment would help 
disabled people move toward desired quality-of-life changes. However, the disabled 
generally face a number of barriers in entering into the workforce and inclusion to the 
society. This calls for public vocational assistance. The major public vocational 
assistance service for adults with disabilities in the United States is the federal 
vocational rehabilitation program. 
 
The federal interest in rehabilitation issues started in 1920s, with the enactment of the 
Vocational Rehabilitation Act, also known as the Smith-Fess Act. The Act begins the 
federal-state partnership in the rehabilitation of individuals with disabilities. The 
passage of the Rehabilitation Act in 1973 marked a significant progress in the federal 
rehabilitation program. It provides the statutory authority for programs and activities 
that help individuals with disabilities in the pursuit of gainful employment, 
independence, self-sufficiency, and full integration into community life. Under the 




                                                 
 
Education has primary responsibility for administering the Act, particularly the 
programs under the Act that are funded through the Department of Education. Within 
the Education department, the Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) is the 
principal agency for carrying out most of programs and activities that provide direct 
support for vocational rehabilitation (VR), independent living, and individual 
advocacy and assistance.  
 
By far, the largest program administered by RSA is the State Vocational 
Rehabilitation Services Program, also known as the Vocational Rehabilitation State 
Grants Program. Title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 authorizes the VR program 
to “empower individuals with disabilities to maximize employment, economic 
self-sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and integration into society.” This 
program funds state VR agencies to provide employment-related services for 
individuals with disabilities to prepare for, gain, and maintain employment. The value 
of VR programs has been well recognized (Bolton, Bellini, & Brookings, 2000; Bond, 
2004; Dutta, Gervey, Chan, Chou, & Ditchman, 2008; Gamble & Moore, 2003). 
Typically, the VR program service more than 1 million people with disabilities 
nationwide each year. More than 90% of the people who use state VR services have 
significant physical or mental disabilities that seriously limit one or functional 
capacities, such as mobility, communication, and interpersonal skills. The 
employment rates of people with disabilities after receiving VR services have been 





The VR program follows a federal-state model. Within the partnership, the federal 
government substantially funds state programs and states are also required to match 
federal funds. Generally, the federal government covers 78.7% of the program’s costs 
through financial assistance to the states for program services and administration. For 
example, in fiscal year 2010, VR programs received $3,040,323,049 federal funding 
and states expended $ 864,073,243 (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). The 
federal government also establishes the program and monitors state program 
operation. For example, RSA conducts periodic on-site reviews and requires state VR 
agencies to submit annual program review, in order to ensure the state follow the 
program goals and requirement under the Rehabilitation Act. States enjoy certain 
latitude in running their VR programs and are responsible for delivers various VR 
services to clients. This federal-state vocational rehabilitation constitutes the policy 
field for the present research project. 
 
4.2  The Purchase of Job-related Services 
 
As mentioned, the importance of employment for people with disabilities has been 
widely accepted. Thus,  job placement and on-the-job support of people with 
disabilities at the highest level possible has been central to the mission of VR 
programs (Rubin, Roessler, & Dunkerby, 1983). Through these job-related services, 
VR programs help clients prepare for, gain, and maintain employment. Specially, the 
job-related services in VR include job search assistance, job placement assistance, 
and on-the-job support. Often, state VR agencies acquire these services from 




service contracts. Figure 4 describes the general contractual relationship in the 
purchase of job-related services. 
 
Figure 4.  The Contractual Relationship in the Purchase of Job-Related Services 
 
Three major players are involved in the rehabilitation process: 
 
• Vocational rehabilitation counselor: The VR counselor is a rehabilitation 
professional, usually with a master degree level, who is an employee of the 
state VR program. The counselor is usually knowledgeable about consumers 
with disabilities and their vocational needs and thus determines the eligibility 
for VR services. The counselor is also responsible for assisting the consumer 
to determine and achieve a suitable vocational objective. The counselor works 
with the customer to devise an individual employment plan that will lead to 
the achievement of the vocational objectives. The counselor is responsible for 
authorizing service contractors for service needs, assuring the services 
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delivered are appropriate, and issuing payment based on service amount and 
consumer achievement. 
 
• Contractor: a vendor of services, mostly a nonprofit community rehabilitation 
program, who has a contract with VR agency to deliver specific services 
leading to employment of consumer in a competitive job3. VR services, such 
as job placement assistance and on-the-job support, are generally delivered by 
an employment specialist, who directly works with a consumer. The VR 
counselor makes authorizations against their contract for specific services. 
 
• Consumer:  an individual with a disability who has been determined eligible 
for VR services by the VR counselor. 
 
Traditionally, these service contracts are process-oriented, making contract 
compensation contingent upon the provision of services. Most of these contracts have 
common elements: defined services, a purchasable unit for each service (e.g., day, 
hour), and a unit cost for each defined service (Revell, West, & Cheng, 1998). The 
3 Competitive employment means work in the competitive labor market that is 
performed on a full-time or part-time basis in an integrated setting; and for which an 
individual is compensated at or above the minimum wage, but not less than the 
customary wage and level of benefits paid by the employer for the same or similar 
work performed by individuals who are not disabled. An Integrated setting is 
typically found in the community in which individuals interact with non-disabled 
individuals, other than support staff, to the same extent that non-disabled individuals 
in comparable positions interact with other persons. 
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predominant purchasable unit for services is an hour. For example, a contractor may 
be paid $30 for each hour of job placement service it provides to an eligible service 
recipient. The popularity of hour-based contracts lies in several aspects. First, service 
contractors can customize service based on individual service needs, because they are 
reimbursed for each hour of service provided to individuals. Second, funding 
agencies have access to individualized information on the specific services provided 
and the impact of their funds. Through intensive reporting by service providers 
throughout the delivery process, funding agencies are able to control the services 
needed for successful employment and the detailed flow of funds. In that way, VR 
agencies actually centralize the service delivery process.  
 
However, the weakness of this contracting method is visible. The hourly fee-for-
service contracts do not readily encourage quality assessment and quality control by 
service providers, as the services are paid for without considering the results of those 
services. Moreover, contractors have limited incentives to encourage service 
recipients to move toward desired employment outcomes. In essence, the hour-based 
contracts emphasize the provision of service per se, i.e., the time spent providing 
those services, rather than the results of those services. Indeed, this contracting 
method equips contractors with disincentives to pursue valued outcomes (client 
independence). Basically, hourly billing tends to bear an inverse relationship to client 
independence: it is in contractors’ fiscal interest to emphasize service provision and 




demonstrates a “triumph of process over results” (Kettner & Martin, 1993, 62) and 
further leads to high service costs and poor employment outcomes. 
 
Therefore, there was an incentive for a more effective contracting approach that 
simultaneously considers valued employment outcomes and the costs to achieve those 
outcomes. Inspired by the national performance movement, PBC emerged as a new 
approach in the purchase of VR placement services. Under PBC, contractors are 
compensated for the outcomes of services rather than the process of service delivery. 
Thus, the defining feature is payment for the valued accomplishments of service 
recipients. This transition from FFS to PBC aims to pay for meaningful and 
measurable employment outcomes at a defined cost. Contractors receive payment 
only if the service recipients they serve successfully achieves defined employment 
outcomes, such as assessment, obtaining employment, and job maintenance for a 
specific time period. For example, the provider may be reimbursed $ 1,000 when a 
service recipient finds a job and $ 1,500 when this client reaches stabilization on the 
job. 
 
Table 10.  Components of VR Services and Contract Type 
 
Service Component Contract type 
Inputs Resources  Staff, facilities, … Fee-for-service 
Process Program activities Job assessment, 
development, coaching 
Fee-for-service 
Outputs Service delivery Completion of services Performance-based 
Outcome 
(short-term) 













Source: Novak et al. (1999). 
  
As Novak, Mank, Revell, and O’Brien (1999) argue, PBC in VR service promises a 
number of benefits: increased emphasis on valued outcomes and accountability for 
results, increased cost efficiency and effectiveness due to streamlined service 
delivery, and increased consumer choices and satisfaction. First, PBC approach 
compensates contractors when service recipients attain successful employment 
outcomes, rather than reimbursing the amount of services delivered and time spent. 
The success of services lie not in the array or number of services provided but in the 
extent to which these services embrace desired results. Along with the innovation, 
there is a change in the institutional environment of VR programs, from an 
accountability for following rules and regulations to an accountability for outcomes, 
in line with the government-wide performance movement. PBC thus enables 
contractors to increase accountability for aligning resources to achieve results.   
 
Second, PBC promotes streamlined service delivery and improves cost efficiency and 
effectiveness. Under PBC, service providers are granted greater flexibility in service 
delivery in return for greater accountability for service performance. It deemphasizes 
regulations and micromanagement of contractor operation throughout the service 
process. Thus, time spent in reporting and paperwork would be largely squeezed. 




serving people with disabilities. This further encourages more cost efficient and 
effective service delivery.  
 
Third, with an outcome orientation, contractors are expected to behave toward more 
effective service delivery. This will lead to the achievement of more timely outcomes 
for service recipients, and thus, increased customer satisfaction. In short, PBC is 
expected to generate a triple win for VR programs: disabled people receiving quick 
and quality services, contractors enjoying less regulation and greater flexibility, and 
state VR agencies achieving better results at lower costs with greater accountability 
(Frumkin, 2001; O’Brien & Revell, 2005). 
 
4.3  PBC Models in VR Services 
 
Oklahoma Milestone Payment System 
 
Oklahoma is a pioneer in the design and use of PBC in the purchase of VR services. 
The Oklahoma Department of Rehabilitation Services (DRS) began providing 
employment assessment and training services for people with severely mental and 
developmental disabilities in 1988, through contracting with community nonprofit 
service vendors. After receiving rehabilitation services, eligible individuals were able 
to achieve placement in local communities. Typically, these services were purchased 
from nonprofit contractors on a fee-for-service basis that reimburses nonprofit 





However, the DRS soon found the program experienced high costs but poor 
performance in helping the disabled for integrated employment in their communities. 
In 1991, bringing one case to closure cost more than $22,000 and took 438 days on 
average (Frumkin, 2001). The DRS attributed this to the distorted incentives in the 
fee-for-service method: it emphasized contractor efforts in delivering services rather 
than in achieving employment outcomes through those services. This further led to an 
inverse relationship between contract payment based on amount of services provided 
and employment outcomes. To address the problem, the DRS designed the Milestone 
Payment System, in which contractors were reimbursed when service recipients 
reached each of milestones leading to employment and long-term stability. 
 
The DRS defined each milestone as a predefined check point on the way to a desired 
outcome, such as case assessment, job placement, and job retention. Each milestone 
may include quality outcome indicators to be accomplished before payment. For 
example, consumer and employer satisfaction with job placement and minimum 
working wage were used as the quality indicators for the milestone on placement. 
Each milestone is associated with a fixed rate payment, with the higher payments 
toward the later milestones. The payment rate at each milestone would reflect the 
average cost of achieving the specific milestone rather than the cost of staff time (as 
under FFS model). Payment rates were negotiated for each milestone. The DRS 
solicited bids from community rehabilitation programs, allowing vendors to include 
in average cost per closures from the previous year multiplied by the estimated 




based on the per-customer bid price and the average cost per closure, as well as past 
service history. After that, the DRS negotiated with community vendors to achieve 
agreements (Frumkin, 2001). An example of milestone payment structure is: (1) 
determination of consumer needs – 10 % of bid; (2) vocational preparation 
completion – 10 % of bid; (3) job placement – 10% of bid; (4) 4 weeks job retention – 
20% of bid; (5) job stabilization – 20% of bid; and (6) consumer rehabilitated 
(stabilization +90 days) – 30 % of bid. 
 
The milestone payment system was first piloted in 1992. After several years’ pilot, 
the DRS converted all the service contracts to the milestone approach in 1997. 
Effectively July 1, 2001, the DRS moved the milestone payment system to the 
statewide fixed rates. Table 11 provides an example of the Oklahoma milestone 
payment system for the purchase of supported employment services4. 
 
Table 11.  Oklahoma Milestone Payment System 
 
Milestone Regular Rate Highly Challenged 
Rate 
Assessment and Career Planning
                 
$   625 $   625 
(Optional) Vocational Preparation
  
$   625 $   625 
Job Placement  $1,688 $3,125 
4 Supported Employment Services is intended for individuals with the most 
significant barrier to employment who require: (1) substantial assistance in making a 
job choice, (2) substantial assistance in getting a job matching that choice, (3) a 
significant degree of job site support to learn the job tasks, gain work adjustment 
skills, and stabilize in employment, and (4) long-term support to retain employment.   
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4 Weeks Job Support 
  
$2,250 $1,875 
8 Weeks Job Support  $1,688 $1,875 
Job Stabilization    
  
$2,125 $2,125 
Successful Employment   $2,875 $4,125 
 
Milestone Outcome Description 
Assessment and 
Career Planning
                 
A determination of the individual’s informed job choice has 
been made, and the specific supports the individual will need 
to perform the chosen job successfully have been identified. 
Vocational 
Preparation  
The individual has clarified his/her career/employment 
objectives which include short-term and long-term vocational 
goals developed collaboratively with the individual. 
Job Placement 
   
The individual has been placed in a job of his/her choice 
meeting the requirements of supported employment and the 
objective in the IPE.  An individual under this contract may 
not become an employee of the Contractor. Job placement is 
complete when the individual has completed the fifth day of 
work. 
4 Weeks Job Support
   
The individual has worked successfully for a minimum of 
four weeks, beginning with the first day of employment (note 
1).   
8 Weeks Job Support
  
The individual has worked successfully for a minimum of 8 
weeks total and has received the appropriate support services 
(Note 1).   
Job Stabilization  
  
  
The individual has worked successfully for the minimum 
required weeks (a total of 12 weeks for individuals receiving 
services under the regular rate and 17 weeks for individuals 
who are highly challenged) and is working the weekly work 





Employment   
The individual has been employed a minimum of 90 days 
beyond stabilization and the case is ready for closure (note 2).   
 
Note 1: Only weeks in which the work hours exceed 40% of the weekly work 
goal, and in which on-site and/or off-site supports are provided, will be 
counted towards the minimum four weeks of this milestone. 
 
Note 2: Only weeks in which hours worked meet the weekly work goal, and 
where needed supports were provided will be counted. 
 
Source: Metro employment services contract 2012, Department of Rehabilitation 
Services, State of Oklahoma 
 
Under the milestone contracting approach, service contractors were reimbursed when 
clients they served achieved certain milestones along the way to successful 
employment. The DRS did not specify the vocational methods to be used; vendors 
had the flexibility in achieving specified outcomes. To encourage contractors to take 
on more difficult clients, the milestone system designed a two-tiered payment rate, 
with a different rate for serving highly challenged clients. VR counselor, working 
with the individual and the contractor, designated the services to be used and whether 
the individual fited the regular or highly challenged rate. Services would be 
purchased on an individual basis as authorized by the counselor. Each milestone 
would be pre-authorized by the counselor and paid only once per case, per contractor, 
upon receipt and acceptance of the required documentation for payment by the 
counselor. Payment of a milestone would constitute payment in full for all services 
delivered during that phase of the program.  
 
In short, the milestone payment system created different incentives for contractors. 




more services before placing customers. Under the milestone payment system, the 
providers’ incomes improved when consumers got jobs of their choices as rapidly as 
possible (O’Brien & Revell, 2005). 
 
The Oklahoma PBC system received extensive recognition and was introduced by 
other states—including Alabama (Valerie, Howard, Dan, Byron, & Amy, 2000), 
Colorado (Block, Athens, & Brandenburg, 2002), Indiana (McGrew, Johannesen, 
Griss, Born, & Katuin, 2005), New York (Gates et al., 2004), etc. --into their 
purchase of VR services. Although there are small variations in the PBC systems 
across states, all these systems were modeled after Oklahoma. 
 
New York PBC Demonstration 
 
The New York State Office of Mental Health implemented a 2-year demonstration of 
PBC to promote employment outcomes (placement and retention) for people with 
serious mental health conditions, starting 2000 (Gates et al., 2004). Before the 
initiative, a traditional fee-for-service method was used, where providers were paid 
quarterly advances for hours spent working with clients regardless of consumer 
outcomes. 
 
The demonstration model included 6 milestone payment points – life skills 
assessment, vocational planning and initial job placement, job skills acquisition, 




milestone was associated with a fixes rate payment, with higher payments toward 
later milestones. The rate was determined by the government agency, factoring in 
provider-estimated costs with provider-estimated consumer success rates at each 
milestone. Additional funding was available for long-term support, encouraging 
contractors to offer time-unlimited support to consumers once they had completed 
milestone VI (retention at 9 months). The same as other PBC models in VR, New 
York also developed a two-tiered payment to avoid creaming problem. Providers 
serving the most difficult clients would receive 20% more payment than serving the 
standard clients. 
 
Table 12.  New York State Milestone Payment System 
 
Milestone Standard Rate Incentive Eligible 
Rate 
Life Skills Assessment  $   750 $   900 
Career Planning & Initial Job 
Placement 
$   750 $   900 
Job Skill Acquisition for 4 Weeks  $1,500 $1,800 
Job Retention at 3 Months   $1,500 $1,800 
Job Retention at 6 Months  $1,875 $2,250 
Job Retention at 9 Months   $1,125 $1,350 
Long-term Job Supports   $1,300/year $1,300/year 
 
Source: O’Brien and Revell (2006).  
 
Indiana Result-based Funding System 
 
To date, Indiana is the latest state that changed from a traditional fee-for-service 




The transition began with a pilot project. In 2002, The Indiana Supported 
Employment Results-based Funding Pilot Project was launched by the Supported 
Employment and Consultation Training (SECT), the Office of Vocational 
Rehabilitation Services (VRS), and the Indiana Division of Mental health and 
Addictions (DMHA) in supported employment services for individuals with severe 
mental health problems. Stakeholders, including government staff representatives, 
contractor, and consumers, were actively involved in the planning stage to determine 
the structure of the RBF system. The pilot RBF system included: (1) completion of 
the person-centered plan - $550 (10% of VRS funding), (2) consumers’ 5th day of 
employment - $1,100 (20% VRS funding), (3) 1 month of employment - $1,100 (20% 
VRS funding), (4) VRS eligible case closure - $2,750 (50% VRS funding), and (5) 9 
months of continuous employment - $1,000 (DMHA funding) (McGrew, Johannesen, 
Griss, Born, & Katuin, 2005). The total amount paid for milestones 1-4 reflected the 
statewide historical average paid by VR per successful case closure under the FFS 
model, plus an amount equal to the average costs of providing services for individuals 
who fail to reach case closure. The milestone 5 was used as an extra bonus to 
incentivize long-term retention.  
 
The Indiana Bureau of Rehabilitation Services changed its statewide contracting 
approach to RBF in late fiscal year 2006. Table 13 provides an example of its RBF 
system. The emphasis of RBF was placed upon structuring service contracting 
method that would increase the likelihood of both initial job placement and long-term 




consumers reached predetermined stages across the employment process. VR 
counselors would make the decisions on milestone authorization and the tiers 
individuals will enter. Each milestone should be authorized at the completion of the 
prior milestone. Providers should not provide services without proper authorization. 
Substantial progress towards the vocational goals needed to be demonstrated 
throughout the service process. 
 
Table 13.  Indiana Result-based Funding System 
 
Milestone Tier I Rate 
(For people who need 
ongoing support) 
Tier II Rate 
(For people who do NOT 
need ongoing support) 
1.  Plan for Employment & Supports $1,200.00 $   600.00 
2.  Job Placement $1,200.00 $   900.00 
3.  Four Week Placement $1,864.00 $1,325.00 
4.  Eligible for Closure $4,000.00 $2,600.00 
TOTAL $8,264.00 $5,425.00 
 
Note:  
Tier One: For people who (1) qualifies as the most severely disabled as defined in the 
state policy, (2) requires multiple services over an extended period of time, and (3) is 
likely to need ongoing, intensive intervention to get and keep a job. 
 
Tier Two: For people who (1) has a disability, severe disability, or most severe 
disability, and (2) would not require ongoing, intensive intervention to get and keep a 
job.  
 
Milestone Outcome Description 
1. Plan for employment & 
supports 
A plan for employment and supports developed by the 




comprised of the customer, Vocational Rehabilitation 
Counselor, employment service provider and any 
other stakeholder or individual the customer desires to 
participate in the meeting. 
2.  Job placement The customer has worked one week at the hours per 
weekly work goal (e.g., based upon hours scheduled) 
in the vocational area identified in the Plan for 
Employment and Supports. 
3.  Four week placement The customer has worked four weeks in which he/she 
met hours per weekly work goal (e.g., based upon 
hours scheduled) and pay rate as stated in the Plan for 
Employment and Supports. The customer is satisfied 
with the job.  The employer has indicated satisfaction 
with the employee.  
4.  Eligible for Closure The customer has maintained employment for 60 
calendar days (for those eligible for Supported 
Employment services) or 90 calendar days for others. 
The customer is employed in a job as outlined in 
his/her Plan for Employment and Supports that is 
commensurate with his/her skills and abilities. The 
customer meets VRS closure criteria. Customer and 
employer are satisfied and this is documented (verbal 
or written reports). 
 
Source: Indiana Bureau of Rehabilitation Services (2006). 
 
4.4  The Use of PBC in VR Services 
 
As can be seen from the discussion above, the use of PBC in the purchase of job-




used in other human service areas mentioned in chapter two, the PBC systems piloted 
and used in VR services in different states are roughly the same, most modeled after 
Oklahoma. This implies that the PBC in VR services has been relatively stable and 
mature, which provides a good policy field for this study to examine the question 
proposed in previous chapters – whether PBC is better than FFS. 
 
Generally, the design of PBC system in VR employment services involves three 
common components: (1) defining the desired employment outcomes, (2) defining 
the payment point for each outcome, including criteria for determining achievement 
of each outcome, and (3) establishing a fee structure for payment points (Novak, 
Mank, Revell, & O’Brien, 1999). First, VR employment services generally proceed 
through several stages – establish job goal, become employed, stabilize in 
employment, and continue in employment. The design of the desired service 
outcomes is in line with these stages. Second, the selection of specific benchmarks 
and criteria to qualify a contractor for reimbursement needs to include consumer and 
employer satisfaction and the quality and stability of services. Third, the fee structure 
reflects the average cost of serving an individual within each defined outcome. 
Indeed, the fee should include contractor costs associated with serving individuals 
who reach an employment outcome and costs historically associated with serving 
individuals who fail to achieve employment outcomes. 
 
Actually, although some studies conclude promising results after the use of PBC, 




example, after the use of the milestone payment system in Oklahoma, a study 
observes that customers’ time on waiting list reduced by 53%, time before placement 
reduced by 18%, time from placement to success reduced by 45% observation, and 
number of people assessed but without placement reduced by 25%5. However, such 
before-after observation is not free from methodological problems. Further, another 
two problems related to PBC effectiveness are not well explored.  
 
The first one is the customer selection or “creaming” problem. Due to the outcome 
orientation, contractors under PBC may prefer serving individuals who appear to be 
easier to place and thus have disincentives to serve people with the most significant 
disabilities. Contractors could maximize earnings by serving only the most readily 
employable people at the expense of serving those with more significant support 
needs. Although the PBC systems used in VR services all include two tiers of 
payment to consider the cost variance between serving regular customers and serving 
difficult customers, the effectiveness of such design is still largely unknown. 
 
Second, the quality of employment outcomes derserves some more attention. Under 
PBC, contractors may be less likely to invest in job matches and job development to 
ensure quality employment. A good placement requires extensive services in job 
preparation and match for job seekers, which extends contractors’ service time and 
cost. However, PBC fosters the achievement of employment milestones in a timely 





                                                 
 
are hard to define and thus are not attached to milestone payment. Although some 
quality indicators such as customer satisfaction and working hours and wages at 
placement, they may not guarantee against contractors’ gaming behaviors. More 
broadly, this questions the effectiveness of PBC on the aspects of employment 
outcomes that are not specifically measured in the PBC systems – do contractors 
gaming the PBC systems? Here, with these questions, we turn to the next two 


















Chapter 5. The Effectiveness of PBC: A Service Outcome Perspective 
 
5.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter starts to evaluate the effectiveness of PBC. The performance of a 
contractual network, as Provan and Milward (2001) argue, is a multi-dimensional 
construct, including community, network, and participating organizations, each with 
different effectiveness criteria (Figure 5). At the community level, networks are 
evaluated by the contribution they bring to the communities and the clients they serve 
in addressing certain policy problems. In this way, the community perspective of 
network effectiveness means “first by assessing aggregate outcomes for the 
population of clients being serve by the network, and second, by examining the 
overall costs of treatment and service for that client group within a given community” 
(Provan & Milward, 2001, 417). At the network level, effectiveness should consider 
the operation of network structure per se. Thus, the effectiveness is evaluated based 
on the growth and function of the network as a whole, such as membership growth, 
range of services provided, and network maintenance. In addition, network 
effectiveness needs to recognize participating organizations involved, their individual 
survival and success in particular. This organization perspective would assess 
network on client outcomes, agency survival, legitimacy, resource acquisition, and 
cost.  
 






Source: Provan & Milward (2001). 
 
Given the bilateral nature of government-contractor structure in PBC, with no 
network-level arrangement involved, this project assesses PBC effectiveness mostly 
from community-level and participating organization-level. This chapter holds a 
community-outcome perspective, leaving the other perspective to next chapter. 
Specifically, it explores whether PBC contributes to the improvement in client well-
being. The research design is to quantitatively compare the employment outcomes 
under two contracting models, FFS and PBC. The unit of analysis is the individual 
client receiving placement services in Indiana. As mentioned, Indiana is the latest 
state in the transition from FFS to PBC, which provides a case that allows using 
administrative data to examine the policy impact of PBC intervention. Several 
approximations of employment outcomes are identified: likelihood of employment, 
time to placement, job retention, and wage. The first two are directly targeted by 
















move through the performance milestones and across the employment process 
quickly in order to receive reimbursement. Thus, I predict: 
 
H1    After using PBC, clients are more likely to attain employment. 
 
H2    After using PBC, clients are able to achieve employment in less time. 
 
In addition to these two indicators, another two employment quality indicators (job 
retention and wage), not directly targeted in the RBF system, are also included to 
examine if the potential performance improvement in employment possibility and 
time to placement is attained through gaming other unmeasured performance. As we 
may notice, these hard-to-measure performance areas are often excluded in 
performance measures in PBC systems. Even in Indiana RBF system, job retention 
(in terms of working hours) and working wages are measured by minimum standards 
such as state minimum hourly wage. Indeed, by leaving high discretion to contractors 
during the service process, PBC implicitly assumes nonprofit contractors would work 
with clients meticulously and innovatively and help them secure high-quality 
employment. Thus, this research would also test: 
 
H3    After using PBC, clients are able to achieve longer job retention. 
 





5.2  Research Design 
 
This research uses an experimental design to examine the treatment effect of PBC in 
Indiana. Experimental designs are widespread in examining the treatment effects of 
policy interventions. The treatment effect in an experiment, intuitively, is the net 
difference between the condition of a unit after receiving a treatment and the 
condition of that unit if it would have not received that treatment. However, these two 
conditions are not possible to observe at the same time in real life: we can only 
observe one of these potential conditions, not both. This “missing data problem” 
(Rubin, 1976) constitutes what Holland (1986) called the “fundamental problem of 
causal inference” (947). Thus, the core task of policy/program evaluation study is 
constructing a counterfactual outcome to estimate the unobserved outcome. This 
implies that we have to find a control group that to a greatest extent approximates the 
treatment one in various aspects. To put it another way, ideally, there should be no 
selection bias between counterfactual outcome of treatment group and observed 
outcome of control group. 
 
When the unit of analysis is a group and the analytical objective is average treatment 
effect, the composition of the samples in groups, or assignment mechanism used to 
assign samples to either treatment group or control group, becomes relevant. A key to 
estimate the causal effects is to identify a control that have units share the 
characteristics with those in treated group, or the distribution of covariates6 is the 
6 Covariate is a variable that is measured before the treatment and thus is not affected 
by the treatment, such as many demographic variables. 
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same for treated and control groups. Generally, there are two experimental designs 
associated with two different assignment mechanisms, randomized experiments, in 
which units are assigned to different conditions randomly, and quasi-experiments, 
where units are assigned to conditions not by chance.  
 
Admittedly, the randomized experimental design is the most desired design in 
evaluation studies. In this true experimental setting, the randomized control trial 
offers a robust and straightforward means to assess treatment effects. Random 
assignment guarantees that there would be no systematic preexisting differences 
between comparison groups before treatment and the only differences on all 
background covariates between two groups before the treatment, if any, are random, 
due to chance. This randomization removes selection bias, ensuring that all the 
characteristics of units are equally distributed between groups. Thus, the intervention 
is the only differentiating factor between groups. The average difference observed in 
outcomes can be attributed to the impact of the intervention (or/and possibly sampling 
error if the sample is not large enough). 
 
However, for various ethical and practical reasons, this ideal randomized 
experimentation is not feasible in current research. Instead, I resort to quasi-
experiment design. In quasi-experimental setting, samples are “collected through the 
observation of systems as they operate in normal practice without any intentions 
implemented by randomized assignment rule” (Rubin, 1997, 757). In this way, 




such as self-selection and administrator selection (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, 
13-14). Thus, it is very likely that “the treated and control groups differ prior to 
treatment in ways that matter for the outcomes under study” (Rosenbaum, 2002, 71). 
In this case, systematical difference in the characteristics besides the treatment may 
influence outcomes, and by directly comparing the difference between outcomes may 
fail to provide robust answers. Thus, more complicated research designs are need to 
address this problem. 
 
5.3  Interrupted Time Series with a Control Group Design  
 
Although quasi-experiments, if well designed, are able to reproduce the same results 
as randomized experiments, extra attention should be paid to correct the potential 
challenges. This study uses an interrupted time series with a nonequivalent control 
group design, diagrammed in Figure 6, to examine the treatment effect of 
performance-based contracting. It compares individual employment outcomes in 
Indiana VR programs before and after the PBC intervention within a time period of 
2004-2009. As mentioned, Indiana, as the treatment group, changed the purchase of 
VR placement services from FFS to PBC in the end of fiscal year 2006. Michigan, 
Indiana’s only neighbor state which kept fully using FFS over time, is added as a 
control group. The repeated cross-sectional data for analysis was requested from the 
Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) of the Department of Education. The 
RSA 911 database reports records pertain to all the individuals whose case records 




services, and employment outcome of all clients receiving state VR services. 
 
Figure 6.  Interrupted Time Series with a Nonequivalent Control Group Design 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
IN O1 O2 O3 X O5 O6 
MI O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 
 
Here, the research relies on Campbell and Stanley’s (1963) typology on the threats to 
internal validity in quasi-experimental designs. The type of quasi-experimental design 
used here is robust in removing most of the threats to internal validity, such as 
maturation, testing, and regression, but still subject to instrumentation, local history, 
and selection (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Shadish et al., 2002). Thus, in order to gain a 
more accurate estimate of the treatment effect, these three potential threats should be 
minimized as much as possible before comparing treatment and control groups. 
Instrumentation may bias causal inference when different administrative procedures 
and measures are used to record participants’ performance over time. However, this 
would not be a big concern for state VR programs. Under the Rehabilitation Act, all 
the administrative and service components, procedures, and standards are under 
rigorous federal regulations. For example, RSA conducts annual reviews and periodic 
on-site monitoring of state VR programs to ensure they comply with program and 
performance requirements under the Rehabilitation Act. In this way, the consistency 





A serious threat comes from selection bias, i.e., differences exist between individuals 
in treatment and control groups. To solve this problem, matched sampling is used to 
correct the observed imbalances between the two states. Matched sampling is a 
resampling strategy, “selecting units from a large reservoir of potential controls to 
produce a control group of modest size that is similar to a treated group with respect 
to the distribution of observed covariates” (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985, 33). After 
matching, two comparison groups are identical on a variety of observed variables, 
which actually replicates a randomized experiment where the treatment assignment is 
unconfounded, at least given the observed covariates (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; 
Rubin, 1973). In particular, this study adopts propensity score matching to produce 
the matched sample. A propensity score, as Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) define, is 
“the conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment given a vector of 
observed covariates” (41)7. Matching samples based on propensity scores allows 
simultaneously considering a variety of covariates. Rather than requiring exact or 
close matching on all covariates separately, propensity score matching enables 
matching on the scalar summary of the covariates. Given the propensity score, each 
unit has the same chance to be assigned to treatment, as in a randomized experiment. 
In essence, the propensity score is a balancing score. Given a propensity score, e(x), 
the distribution of the observed covariates x is the same in both treatment and control 
groups.  Matching treated and control based on the propensity score could create new 
comparison groups that are identical on a vector of those observed covariates 
7 The propensity score for subject i (i=1, … , N) to be assigned to treatment (Z=1) 
versus control (Z=0) given a vector of observed covariates xi is e (xi) = Pr (Zi=1| xi) 
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(homogeneous)8, replicating a randomized experiment based on these covariates. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) also proved that treatment assignment and the observed 
covariates are conditionally independent given the propensity score. Thus, exact 
matching based on propensity score enables to remove bias due to all observed 
covariates and to produce unbiased estimation of the average treatment effect, 
measured by the difference in means in the outcome between treated and control 
groups. 
 
Local context might also bias causal inference when the individuals in comparison 
groups reside in different settings. To address this issue, this study chooses Michigan 
as the control group against Indiana, aiming to maximize the socio-economic 
similarities between the two. In addition, I use difference-in-differences (DID) 
regressions after matched sampling to further adjust the unobserved imbalance. Under 
the DID model, any bias caused by exogenous variables common to Indiana and 
Michigan could implicitly be controlled for, even when these variables are 
unobserved. There is indeed some evidence to support the common trend assumption 
of the DID model during 2004-2009. The state-level factors that might affect 
employment outcomes, including GDP growth, unemployment rate, average weekly 
earnings, and VR program capacity (measured by average number of clients served 
per program staff) were found to roughly follow the same trend (See Appendix 1). I 
also reviewed the annual review reports of Indiana and Michigan VR programs and 
8 It is possible that two units with the same propensity score may be different in a 




                                                 
 
didn’t find any major policy changes on the purchase of employment services. 
Therefore, I have somewhat strong confidence in assuming that the two states have 
parallel trends over time. 
 
Indeed, running DID regressions on matched samples embraces a number of 
advantages. First, the combination of the two methods is most robust and efficient in 
removing the biases due to covariates and estimating the treatment effect on the 
treated (Abadie & Imbens, 2006; Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997; Rubin, 1973; 
1979). A major problem in the use of matched sampling is inexact matching—it is not 
always possible to find enough matched treatment and control samples with exactly 
the same observed characteristics (Rubin, 1979). This is especially the case as the 
number of matching variables increases. Given the imperfect matching, the estimated 
treatment effect might not be accurate. However, when putting matched sampling and 
model-based regression together, matched sampling substantially reduces observed 
covariate differences, and model-based adjustment afterwards could further controls 
for residual differences.  
 
Second, matched sampling relaxes the DID identification restrictions. Model-based 
regression adjusts the effect of confounding variables by estimating the relationship 
between the dependent variable and the confounding variables. The major problem 
associated with this method is that the model assumptions may be unwarranted in 
many cases. For example, the linear relationships with the dependent variable and 




makes model-based adjustment less sensitive to model specification. This again 
allows the estimation of parsimonious parametric approximations of the average 
treatment effect on the treated. (Abadie, 2005; Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007).  
 
Guo and Fraser(2010), through a data simulation, also show that under the ideal 
conditions like randomized experiment, both methods work equally well, leading to 
accurate estimation of treatment effect with biases closing to zero. However, in quasi-
experimental situation, especially when treatment assignment is not ignorable, 
although either method could remove the biases to a different extent, neither method 
could produce unbiased estimation of treatment effect. Also through a simulation, 
Rubin (1973; 1979) finds that model-based adjustment could produce smaller 
standard errors than matched samples when the model is correctly specified. 
However, when the model is inaccurate, model-based adjustment would be less 
robust, not remove biases, but increasing them. Given this, it is suggested that the 
combination of matched sampling and regression adjustment to be the most robust 
method for producing the least biased estimate and controlling the biases due to the 
imbalances in observed covariates (Cochran & Rubin, 1973; Rubin, 1979). In a word, 
as Abadie (2005) suggests, this combined method “allow[s] for the distribution of 
both observed and unobserved factors to differ between treated and untreated, as long 
as the effect of unobserved factors on the outcome does not vary with time (or, more 






5.4  Propensity Score Matching 
 
Propensity score matching was first used to produce matched samples. When 
conducting propensity score matching, I followed the procedures suggested by 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Guo and Fraser (2010). 
 
1. Specification of Conditioning Model 
 
The first step in conducting propensity score analysis is determining which covariates 
and conditioning model to be used to estimate propensity score. After all, the 
accuracy of the specification of covariates and models would affect the effectiveness 
of propensity score analysis and final estimation of the treatment effect (Heckman, 
Ichimura, & Todd, 1997; Rubin, 1997). However, there is no guideline available in 
current literature on propensity score analysis providing definitive answers. 
  
Theoretically, in order to meet the assumption of ignorable treatment assignment, all 
covariates that might be related to treatment assignment and the outcome should be 
included into the conditioning model (Glazerman, Levy, & Myers, 2003; Rubin & 
Thomas, 1996; Stuart & Rubin, 2007). Omitting important variables would seriously 
increase bias in resulting estimates (Dehejia & Wahba, 1999). Shadish et al. (2008) 
warn that only relying on small set of “predictors of convenience,” such as 
demographic factors, would lead to poor matching performance. However, in most 
cases there is no comprehensive list of such conditioning variables explicitly. 




generally suggest including a large set of covariates of theoretical relevance (Greevy, 
Lu, Silber, & Rosenbaum, 2004; Lunceford & Davidian, 2004). Actually, including 
variables that are little unassociated with the outcome might slightly increase 
variance, but excluding potentially important variables would increase bias. As Rubin 
and Thomas (1996) argue, “unless a variable can be excluded because there is a 
consensus that it is unrelated to outcome or is not a proper covariate, it is advisable to 
include it in the propensity score model even if it is not statistically significant” (253). 
This paper follows this convention. 
 
In view of theoretical relevance and data availability, in this study, we include three 
categories of covariates in Table 14 —demographic background (age, education, race, 
gender, veteran status, primary disability, secondary disability), pre-service status 
(employment status, work disincentives, previous service status, Projects with 
Industry status), and employment service received (number of placement services 
received)—that are thought to be related to either treatment assignment or outcome. 
 




Description and Measurement 
Demographic Background 
Age An individual’s age at service application 
Education An individual’s level of education attained at application, 
with 0=less than high school, 1=special education, 2=high 
school graduate, 3=post-secondary/associate degree, and 
4=college degree or higher 
Race An individual’s race and ethnicity, with 0=black or African 
American, 1=native American (American Indian, Alaska 




3=white, 4=Hispanic or Latino 
Gender  An individual’s gender status, with 0=male, 1=female 
Veteran An individual’s veteran status, 0=not a veteran, 1=veteran 
Primary disability An individual’s primary physical or mental impairment, with 
0=sensory/communication impairments, 1=physical 
impairments, 2=mental impairments 
Secondary 
disability 
An individual’s second physical or mental impairment, with 
0=no impairment, 1=sensory/communication impairments, 
2=physical impairments, 3=mental impairments 
Pre-service Status 
Employment status An individual’s employment status at application, with 
0=not employed, 1=employment 
Work disincentives The number of public support an individual had at 
application, including supplemental security income (SSI), 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), general 
assistance from state or local government, social security 
disability insurance (SSDI),veterans’ disability benefits, 
workers’ compensation, Medicaid, Medicare, medical 
insurance not through employment, and others 
Previous service 
status 
If an individual had received previous employment service, 
with 0=no previous closure, 1= closed before services, 




If an individual participates in Projects with Industry 
program, with 0=no, 1=yes 
Employment Services 
No. of placement 
services received 
The number of employment services an individual received 
throughout service process, including job search assistance, 
job placement assistance, and on-the-job supports 
 
The propensity score, in its essence, is a balancing score representing a vector of 
covariates. Unlike in randomized experiments9, propensity scores in quasi-
experiments are unknown and must be estimated. Propensity scores are often 
estimated using binary logistic regression with observed covariates X as independent 
variables and treatment assignment D (D=1 for treatment condition, D=0 for control 
9 In randomized experiments, each unit has a 50% probability of being assigned to 
either treatment or control group. Thus, the propensity score for each unit is 0.5, 
without considering sampling error. 
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is the regression parameters 
 
In using logistic regression to predict the value of propensity score, the aim of the 
modeling is not to estimate the parameters, but to balance the covariates between 
treatment and control groups. Thus, many traditional regression diagnosis methods, 
such as collinearity check and model fit statistics, are no longer helpful in model 
specification here. Rather, the balancing property of the propensity score is used to 
justify a model specification (Dehejia & Wahba, 1999; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1984).  
 
Researchers find that treatment effect estimation is not sensitive to the model 
specification used to predict the propensity score, as long as the balancing property of 
the propensity score holds (Waernbaum, 2010; Zhao, 2008). Misspecification of 
propensity score model under this condition would not bring bias to the treatment 
effect estimation.   
 
The present project adopts the strategy suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984), by correcting function form of covariates and adding 




check the balance of the covariates based on the propensity scores. Particularly, I 
used STATA program pscore.ado developed by (Becker & Ichino, 2002) to estimate 
propensity scores. In particular, this program helps ensure the balancing property of 
propensity scores, i.e. observations with the same propensity scores should have the 
same distribution of observed characteristics, regardless of treatment status. The 
program first splits the sample into several spaced intervals of the propensity score 
and test whether the mean propensity score of the treatment and control units are 
statistically different within each interval. If the test fails in one interval, the program 
would split the interval in half and retest within each finer interval until the mean 
propensity score of the treatment and control units become balanced. Again, within 
each interval, testing the means of each covariate to ensure that there is no statistical 
difference between treatment and control units. If one or more covariates are not 
balanced in all intervals, the balance property is not supported by the current model 
specification and specification modification is necessary by adding more interaction 
and higher order terms. 
 
2. Choose Matching Algorithm 
 
After estimating propensity scores, we move onto match treatment units with control 
units based on the value of propensity score. To date, there are already a number of 
matching algorithms available, including greedy matching, kernel matching, etc. 
Dehejia and Wahba (2002) highlight three major decisions in the choice of matching 




match with each treatment unit, and (3) match with replacement or without 
replacement: reduce bias (with replacement); increase precision (without 
replacement); inexact matching vs. incomplete matching. Unfortunately, there has 
been no clear rule for determining which matching algorithm works best under what 
conditions; there is always a tradeoff between bias and efficiency. It is largely 
dependent on data per se and the research design.  
 
In this study, we use 1-to-1 nearest neighbor matching within caliper without 
replacement, one of the most common matching algorithms, so-called greedy 
matching10. This matching algorithm randomly orders the treatment and control units, 
and selects for each treatment unit a control unit with the smallest distance from the 
treatment one. Once a control unit was matched to a treatment unit, it was removed 
from the control group without replacement. The most attractive feature of this 
matching algorithm is that it allows multivariate analysis used directly after matched 
sampling, without extra statistical adjustment (Guo & Fraser, 2010). 
 
One limitation of this 1-to-1 nearest neighbor matching is that there is no restriction 
on the distance between two matched units, as long as they are nearest neighbors 
based on propensity scores. It is possible that these two units are very different in 
10 The trade-off between bias and variance: Matching one nearest neighbor minimizes 
bias at the cost of larger variance; matching using additional nearest neighbors 
increase the bias but decreases the variance. Matching with replacement keeps bias 
low at the cost of larger variance; matching without replacement keeps variance low 
at the cost of potential bias. 
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terms of propensity scores, but there is no one that is closer. Thus, I add a caliper (a 
quarter of a standard deviation of the propensity scores of the sample (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1985) to the nearest neighbor matching, choosing matched units only when the 
absolute distance between the two units (in terms of propensity scores) are within a 
predetermined caliper.   
 
The detailed algorithm is as follows: let  and  are the propensity scores for the 
treatment and control units i and j,  is the set of control units matched to the 
treatment unit, and  is the caliper. One control unit with the estimated propensity 
scores falling within a caliper  from  are matched to the treated unit i. The matched 




3. Balancing Tests 
 
After matching, it is expected that the preexisted statistical differences in the 
covariate means between two comparison groups should be eliminated. And the two 
groups are comparable in that the distributions of observed covariates are identical in 
treated and control groups. Before moving forward, we need to check covariate 






I check covariate balance before and after matching using the absolute standardized 
difference in covariate means (D'Agostino, 1998; Haviland, Nagin, & Rosenbaum, 
2007). The absolute standardized difference is the absolute value of the mean 
difference as a percentage of the average standard deviation. For each covariate X,  
and  are the means in the treatment and control groups, and  and  are the 
corresponding variances, respectively, the absolute standardized difference includes 
two standardized measures:    
 
  contrasts covariate values for treatment units with covariate values of all 




 contrasts covariate values for treatment units with covariate values of all 




Table 15 show the results of covariate balance check. For each year, the absolute 
standardized difference compares the covariate values of the treatment individuals 
with those of the control individuals before matching ( ) and with those of the 
matched control individuals after matching ( ). T-tests examine the equality of 
covariate means in the treatment and control groups, both before and after matching.  
 100 
 
Table 15. Covariate Balance Check Before and After Matching 









































































Age 22.6 12.1** 3.39 7.0 14.4** 3.14 11.8 17.7** 3.65 15.1 5.8 1.67 22.6 7.8 1.63 30.0 11.9** 5.61 
Gender 4.0 6.9 1.93 7.4 5.8 1.27 5.5 10.6** 2.17 11.3 12.2** 2.75 7.8 13.3** 2.92 2.1 0.5 0.10 
Race 23.7 1.8 0.50 6.7 6.1 1.30 12.7 7.2 1.46 12.5 5.4 1.63 17.0 2.0 0.40 14.0 5.8 1.07 
Education 0.1 5.0 1.39 2.8 0.6 0.13 7.1 4.5 1.22 0.5 2.9 0.63 3.4 5.3 1.11 7.4 7.6 1.50 
Veteran status 22.1 15.5** 4.44 18.4 20.7** 4.25 11.5 18.4** 3.41 6.8 7.9 1.70 20.9 7.8** 3.99 14.7 8.4 2.04 
Projects with 
industry 
2.9 2.8 0.71 7.7 1.9 0.45 4.6 0.0 0.00 8.9 1.9 0.58 2.8 2.3 0.38 9.8 2.1 0.45 
Primary disability 12.0 5.4 1.47 18.7 16.7** 3.59 10.7 7.3 1.53 15.1 11.4** 3.29 15 7.7** 2.15 15.3 3.4 0.88 
Secondary 
disability 
36.6 6.0 1.69 37.2 16.3* 3.53 22.9 13.3** 2.75 21.7 16.6 3.80 28.7 13.6** 2.99 25.1 9.8 1.94 
Employment status 10.8 3.5 0.94 4.4 0.0 0.00 7.8 6.5 1.33 1.0 2.8 0.63 9.2 1.7 0.48 0.8 1.2 0.23 
Work disincentives 1.6 0.1 0.02 5.9 1.4 0.30 11.0 4.4 0.90 0.2 8.9 1.96 4.4 4.8 1.02 0.5 2.7 0.54 
Previous 
closure/service 
11.2 3.9 1.10 8.8 9.4** 2.03 8.7 9.0 1.86 6.5 3.5 1.00 16.3 4.5 1.25 13.2 6.2 1.59 
No. of placement 
services received 
14.9 8.0** 2.40 69.9 6.5 1.49 69.9 3.0 0.67 60.9 1.8 0.44 55.5 4.1 0.93 57.2 2.7 0.56 
**significant at .05; two-tailed tests. 
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Age 21.1 8.4 1.38 22.5 8.7 1.76 23.1 8.6 1.69 9.7 0.9 0.19 36.4 15.3** 2.97 25.0 17.8** 2.98 
Gender 0.5 5.5 0.90 7.5 7.6 1.14 10.1 5.0 0.68 14.7 14.9** 2.20 11.0 3.6 0.71 4.0 5.6 0.68 
Race 15.8 5.9 0.90 11.0 8.7 1.80 6.0 1.0 0.14 16.3 3.6 0.51 13.6 10.4 1.41 8.6 2.0 0.22 
Education 3.7 4.7 0.73 8.9 6.0 1.39 22.2 7.0 1.34 11.7 5.1 1.05 13.2 12.7 1.70 13.4 4.6 0.54 
Veteran status 25.2 12.5** 2.43 16.3 13.6** 2.96 44.1 18.2** 3.25 19.2 12.0** 2.33 4.9 3.9 0.45 7.0 9.1 1.08 
Projects with 
industry 
6.0 5.8 1.00 5.7 4.0 0.58 3.9 0.0 -- 5.7 5.1 0.58 8.6 0.9 0.17 12.4 4.0 0.58 
Primary disability 17.6 14.0** 2.23 23.2 18.8** 2.7 15.4 7.9 1.55 10.4 10.3 1.93 20.4 15.8** 3.03 8.2 1.1 0.19 
Secondary 
disability 
35.3 13.8** 2.21 31.1 12.9 1.91 23.9 18.3** 3.63 21.4 23.1** 3.51 25.9 7.2 1.35 33.4 15.5 1.89 
Employment 
status 
9.6 5.5 0.88 2.9 1.2 0.16 4.8 1.1 0.22 11.0 2.0 0.04 5.4 0.2 0.04 7.3 1.4 0.24 
Work 
disincentives 
0.5 1.7 0.27 12.0 7.4 1.08 17.7 13.8** 3.10 5.9 1.0 0.15 21.1 4.2 0.82 19.5 7.1 0.85 
Previous 
closure/service 
5.5 3.0 0.48 9.4 0.7 0.15 13.9 6.3 1.24 12.4 2.8 0.58 19.7 5.8 1.14 3.3 5.6 0.70 
No. of placement 
services received 
21.2 1.7 0.34 89.8 3.1 0.52 98.2 0.0 0.00 89.4 1.2 0.21 88.9 1.3 0.22 90.7 6.2 0.83 
**significant at .05; two-tailed tests. 
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For good matching, should be less than 5% after matching and t-statistic should 
be not significant after matching. In this vein, as can be seen from Table 15, the 
matched sampling in this study is quite effective in removing substantial part of the 
preexisting differences between two comparison states, but not all of them, as 
expected.  
 
5.5  Difference-in-difference Regressions 
 
After propensity score matching, matched sample has removed most of the imbalance 
between comparison groups at least in observed covariates. With the matched sample, 
I moved on to DID analyses to estimate the impact of PBC on Indiana clients, in 
terms of four employment outcome indicators. The general DID model is as follows: 
 












X1 contains “demographic background” variables, including age, education, 
race, gender, primary disability, and secondary disability. 
 
X2 contains “pre-service status” variables, including employment status, work 
disincentives, previous service status, and participation in projects with 
Industry. 
 
X3 contains “employment services” variable, i.e., number of placement 
services received. 
 
Tables 16 and 17 present the DID regression results. Within each model, the 
interaction effect between the variable of Indiana and the variable of service period 
2007-2009 is the differences-in-differences estimator of the treatment effect. First, 
logistic regression was employed to predict the differences in the likelihood of 
attaining employment result for those who received employment services before and 
after PBC. Before discussing the parameters of detailed variables, tests of goodness of 
fit of the regression model were performed. The logistic regression model is 
statistically significant (likelihood ratio chi-square=1102.74, p= .0000), meaning that 
the model specified is significantly better than the model with only the constant. 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test for overall goodness of fit was also added. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow chi-square equals to 8.943 (p= .063), implying that the differences 
between the observed and fitted values are small. Both tests show that the logistic 
model is reliable to produce meaningful inference. Generally, after the introduction of  
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Table 16  Logistic Regression Model Predicting Likelihood of Employment for Service Recipients (N = 12, 372) 
Variable Odds Ratio Standard 
Error 
Z Value 
State and Service Year 
State (Indiana) 0.7561*** 0.0397 -5.33 
Service Year 2007-2009 0.8287*** 0.0450 -3.46 
Indiana Service Year 2007-
2009 
1.4991*** 0.1144 5.30 
Demographic Background 
Age 0.9975 0.0016 -1.55 
Education 
    Special education 1.3384*** 0.1207 3.23 
    High school graduate 1.2281** 0.1099 2.30 
    Post-secondary/associate 
degree 
1.2460** 0.1249 2.19 
    College degree or higher 1.4369*** 0.1783 2.92 
Race 
    Native American 0.4991** 0.1455 -2.38 
    Asian 1.4769* 0.3241 1.78 
    White 1.3715*** 0.0707 6.13 
    Hispanic or Latino 1.4601*** 0.1847 2.99 
Gender (Female) 0.8292*** 0.0326 -4.76 
Veteran 0.8319* 0.0846 -1.81 
Primary disability 
    Physical impairments 0.7305*** 0.0810 -2.83 
    Mental impairments 1.0239 0.1065 0.23 
Secondary disability 
    Sensory/communication 
impairments 
1.0099 0.0.1084 0.09 
    Physical impairments 0.8492*** 0.0480 -2.89 
    Mental impairments 0.8156*** 0.0358 -4.46 
105 
Pre-service Status 
Currently employed 2.0271*** 0.1071 13.38 
Work disincentives 0.9278*** 0.0160 -4.36 
Previous closure/service 
    Closed before services 0.8738* 0.0650 -1.81 
    Closed after services 1.2990*** 0.0640 5.31 
Participation in Projects 
with Industry 
3.4439*** 1.4556 2.93 
Employment Services 
No. of placement services 
received 
2.8868*** 0.1392 21.99 
Likelihood ratio chi square 1102.74*** 
Pseudo R2 .2653 
*significant at .1; **significant at .05; ***significant at .01; two-tailed tests.
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Time to placement 
Model (2) 






t-value Coefficient Robust 
Standard 
Error 




State and Service Year  
State (Indiana) 123.7927*** 9.69203 12.77 -2.7736*** 0.3925 -7.07 -40.4802*** 5.4046 -7.49 
Service Year 2007-2009 28.1780*** 9.7877 2.88 -1.2952*** 0.3868 -3.35 2.3857 5.4851 0.43 
Indiana Service Year 2007-
2009 
-72.1985*** 14.3650 -5.03 1.3291** 0.5603 2.37 4.3715 7.2722 0.60 
Demographic Background 
Age -2.3190*** 0.31189 -7.44 -0.0200 0.0122 -1.63 0.4703*** 0.1642 2.86 
Education          
    Special education -0.5269 16.9582 -0.03 0.2597 0.6692 0.39 9.7036 6.3365 1.53 
    High school graduate -24.6122 16.6818 -1.48 2.9657*** 0.6654 4.46 41.5547*** 6.4365 6.46 
    Post-secondary/associate 
degree 
-14.8805 18.2926 -0.81 5.1137*** 0.7445 6.87 83.4660*** 9.0927 9.18 
    College degree or higher 34.4609 21.8180 1.58 4.6625*** 0.8734 5.34 163.9384*** 17.9561 9.13 
Race          
    Native American -17.4687 49.6692 -0.35 0.1325 1.9237 0.07 5.2426 23.7536 0.22 
    Asian 57.3725 56.6339 1.01 -3.8100** 1.7111 -2.23 -40.9341** 17.1552 -2.39 
    White 16.1171* 9.6736 1.67 -0.5949 0.4910 -1.45 -6.2492 5.1003 -1.23 
    Hispanic or Latino -26.7465 26.3873 -1.01 0.2442 0.9318 0.26 -10.9634 11.0435 -0.99 
Gender (Female)  8.6879 7.7448 1.12 -2.5881*** 0.2936 -8.81 -32.0111*** 3.7005 -8.65 
Veteran -18.0695 19.4540 -0.93 1.3458* 0.7870 1.71 29.1764** 13.6200 2.14 
Primary disability          
    Physical impairments -25.4000 20.0359 -1.27 0.1200 0.8080 0.15 -2.3717 17.4014 -0.14 
    Mental impairments -52.5525*** 18.0453 -2.91 -2.8383*** 0.7448 -3.81 -55.7796*** 15.5328 -3.59 
Secondary disability          
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    Sensory/communication 
impairments 
-14.1650 17.5393 -0.81 -3.0087*** 0.7232 -4.16 -25.6520*** 8.5062 -3.02 
    Physical impairments -7.8156 10.0790 -0.78 -1.2690*** 0.4236 -3.00 -8.4449 5.6663 -1.49 
    Mental impairments -15.1077* 8.2807 -1.82 -0.1644 0.3292 -0.50 -4.0529*** 1.5932 -26.29 
Pre-service Status 
Currently employed 7.905325 9.4227 0.84 -0.2275 0.3484 -0.65 11.1346** 5.1178 2.18 
Work disincentives 3.0327 2.971615 1.02 -3.8039*** 0.1238 -30.47 -41.8839*** 1.5932 -26.29 
Previous closure/service          
    Closed before services -13.2639 13.1365 -1.01 0.1923 0.5492 0.35 -8.0276 6.8302 -1.18 
    Closed after services -22.0510*** 8.3032 -2.66 -1.2896*** 0.3354 -3.85 -18.4833*** 3.8301 -4.83 
Participation in Projects 
with Industry 
-41.4231 59.0265 -0.70 -1.4386 2.4348 -0.59 -61.2789** 25.8489 -2.37 
Employment Services 
No. of placement services 
received 
93.0754*** 12.3244 7.55 -1.9901*** 0.4011 -4.96 -35.1571*** 5.7619 -6.10 
          
Constant 292.321*** 31.31243 9.34 37.6258*** 1.2273 30.66 336.2284*** 19.0697 17.63 
          
F-test 15.70***   81.59***   56.09***   
R2 .2707   .2601   .2805   
 















PBC in 2007, Indiana clients experienced higher employment possibilities (odds 
ratio=1.4991, p< .01)11.  
 
Second, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions were run to compare three 
performance indicators of employment outcomes before and after PBC: (1) time to 
placement, (2) weekly working hours, and (3) weekly earnings (adjusted by inflation). 
Before regression analyses, a series of regression diagnostics were conducted to 
ensure the basic assumptions of OLS regression are met. Both White's and Breusch-
Pagan tests imply strong concern for heteroscedasticity of the residuals. Thus, robust 
standard errors were used in regression models. Overall, these three models are 
significant, with an F value of 15.7 (p < .0001) for the model on time to placement, 
11 The interpretation of interaction effects in nonlinear models is still under much 
econometric discussion (Ai & Norton, 2003; Athey & Imbens, 2006; Greene, 2010; 
Karaca‐Mandic, Norton, & Dowd, 2012). Ai and Norton (2003) argue that in 
nonlinear models the marginal effect of the interaction term does not represent the 
magnitude of the interaction effect. The interaction effect depends on all the 
covariates, and thus requires computing the cross derivative of the expected value of 
the dependent variable. The statistical significance of the interaction effect should be 
based on the estimated cross-partial derivative. Puhani (2012) and Karaca-Mandic, 
Norton, and Dowd (2012) further demonstrate that under difference-in-difference 
context, the incremental effect of the coefficient of the interaction term could 




                                                 
 
an F value of 81.59 (p < .0001) for the model on weekly working hours, and an F 
value of 56.09 (p < .0001) for the model on weekly earnings. All the models also 
explain substantial portions of the variations of the dependent variables, 27.07%, 
26.01%, and 28.05%, respectively. 
 
The regression model on time to placement shows individual employees in Indiana 
after the use of PBC spent 72 days (p< .01) less to achieve employment outcomes, 
which is consistent with our hypothesis that PBC motivates service contractors to 
achieve employment outcomes rapidly. The models on employment quality (working 
hours and wages) demonstrate mixed results. The same as our hypothesis on job 
retention, individuals in Indiana worked 1.33 hours (p< .05) longer than their 
counterparts weekly during 2004-2006. The hypothesis on wages is partially 
supported. Weekly wages of Indiana employees increased by $4.37 after the 
introduction of PBC, but the difference is not statistically significant even at p< .1 
level. However, these small differences on working hours and wages, though 
meaningful in a statistical sense, are actually of no real policy significance.   
 
5.6  Conclusion 
 
The managerial motivation behind all the performance-based management strategies 
is the phrase that “what gets measured gets done.” The introduction of PBC in human 
service provision is no exception. By attaching contract compensation to performance 
achievements, PBC draws contractors to move toward desired service outcomes in a 




considerable discretion throughout service process, aiming to encourage innovative 
and quality customer services that would further result in better service outcomes. 
This chapter, using a community-outcome perspective, tests these claims by 
examining the employment service outcomes under two contracting approaches. As 
predicted, PBC encourages the achievement of employment outcomes in shorter time 
periods. But the differences between two models in terms of working hours and 
wages are trivial. It seems “what gets done is what gets measured.” Combining these 
quantitative evidences together, a conclusion could be made that PBC is better than 
FFS in that it achieves desired employment outcomes in a more efficient way, without 
degrading employment quality.   
 
The study in this chapter may suffer from two categories of limitations. First, as 
mentioned earlier, the local differences between two states were out of full control. In 
quasi-experiments, there are always risks of comparing different people in different 
contexts. In propensity score matching, samples are matched on observed covariates, 
assuming that there are no unobserved differences between the treatment and control 
groups. This assumption might be too strong to be true in real context –balance on 
observed covariates may not rule out the role of unobserved differences. To address 
this potential bias, this research introduced DID on matched samples to further adjust 
unobserved covariates. Although the paper has some evidence to support the common 
trend between two states, it still cannot guarantee the similarity in local communities 
over time where employment outcomes are embedded. Michalopoulos, Bloom, and 




would potentially bias the estimation of treatment effect, because these groups may 
be exposed to different local situations and thus unobserved variables. This warning 
is particularly relevant as we do social program evaluations using comparison groups 
across service jurisdictions. Heckman et al. (1997) also warns that the bias might be 
larger in out-of-state comparison groups than in-state comparison groups due to 
geographic mismatch, such as different geographic location and local labor market. 
 
Second, the present research wouldn’t compare the differences in several other 
indicators on employment services, due to the data availability. One major concern on 
the effectiveness of PBC is the client selection program – contractors may have fiscal 
incentives to decline severe clients to achieve performance outcomes. Unfortunately, 
the data used here only records the individuals who had been admitted into service 
processes. Besides, the costs to achieve employment outcomes under two contracting 
models were not observed, either. Generally, such costs should include two parts, 
service costs in the purchase of services from contactors and administrative costs in 
monitoring contractors. Theoretically, PBC is more economical by shortening service 
duration and reducing monitoring and reporting. Moreover, the long-term 
employment effect was not examined, either. In this study here, short-term indicators 
(working hours and wages at closure) were used as proxies. However, as previously 
noted, VR services target the long-term stability and welfare of disabled people.  
 
In short, this chapter evaluates PBC effectiveness from a community-outcome 




individual employment outcomes under two contracting approaches. 
Methodologically, this research design didn’t address two things. First, as mentioned 
above, the quantitative methods used here have a number of limitations, which might 
bias the robustness of the findings. Second, holding a service-outcome perspective, 
we might ignore the causes behind the findings here that are directly derived from 
administrative data and miss rich details of PBC implementation in the real service 
setting. With these in mind, we turn to next section, qualitatively assessing PBC 

















































Chapter 6.  The Effectiveness of PBC: Government and Contractor 
Perspectives 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter will evaluate PBC effectiveness from a participating-organization 
perspective. As mentioned in the previous chapter, network effectiveness should also 
consider the organizations involved in the contractual networks. Indeed, their survival 
and success affect the effectiveness and sustainability of a network. Often, individual 
organizations have different interests and hold different motivations in participating 
in service-provision networks. How the network structure (i.e., PBC arrangement) 
defines and influences the behaviors and incentives of participating organizations is 
the central question of this chapter. Generally, two types of organizations are 
involved in the provision of VR services, government and service contractors. Thus, 
the chapter will assess the organization-level effectiveness of PBC from these two 
perspectives. Particularly, the chapter holds a street-level lens and uses qualitative 
methods in the examination of PBC implementation by the two actors. 
 
6.2  Street-level Perspective in Policy Analysis 
 
Policy implementation is complicated. Policy implementation, as Bardach (1977) 
defines, is “(1) a process of assembling the elements required to produce a particular 
programmatic outcome, and (2) the playing out of a number of loosely interrelated 
games whereby these elements are withheld from or delivered to the program 




shown “the complexity of joint action” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973) and the “great 
difficulty of organizing cooperative activity on a large scale” (Derthick, 1972) in 
converting policy intents into policy actions. 
 
Scholarly research on policy implementation has identified two analytical 
approaches: top-down and bottom-up12. The top-down approach, or what Elmore 
(1979) calls “forward mapping,” begins at the top of the process, with a clear 
emphasis on policy designers as the central actors. It traces policy implementation 
along the hierarchical structure within traditional bureaucratic system and explores 
the ways to guide and constrain the behavior of civil servants and target groups in 
realizing the policymaker's intent. In this vein, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) 
consider policy implementation as “the carrying out of a basic policy decidsion, 
usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important 
executive orders or court decisions … ” (20). Thus, the prescription developed by this 
school of thought to ensure faithful implementation generally centers on formal 
organizational structures, authority relationships, control and regulations, 
administrative responsibility, and so on. The implicit assumption behind this 
approach is that policymakers control the administrative and political resources that 
are needed to guarantee policy implementation. 
 
12 There is another so-called “third-generation” approach of policy implementation 
study, claiming for a synthesis of both top-down and bottom-up frameworks (e.g., 
Matland, 1995; Sabatier, 1986). But there is actually little advancement in this regard. 
See O’Toole (2000) for more details. 
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On the contrary, the bottom-up approach, or “backward mapping” (Elmore, 1979), 
emphasizes policy implementation at local level and considers the role of local actors 
in the interpretation of grand policy goals. Due to local differences, the remote 
control enforced by policy makers is inevitably incomplete and thus lower-level 
administrators would enjoy certain discretion in turning policy intent into policy 
action. Based on this, this school of thought argues that it is how lower-level 
administrators use their discretion to adjust to local context that determines the real 
meaning of a policy. This strand of research typically explores the dynamics on the 
recipient level and analyzes the real causes that influence the mutual adaptation of a 
policy to its local organizational setting. 
 
“The crucial difference of perspective”, as Elmore (1979) writes, “stems from 
whether one chooses to rely primarily on formal devices of command and control that 
centralize authority or on informal devices of delegation and discretion that disperse 
authority” (605). The top-down approach is concerned more with compliance, while 
bottom-up approach values bargaining and compromise. In social policy, Berman 
(1978) distinguishes “federal macro-implementation” from “local micro-
implementation,” tailored to the dichotomous institutional nature of policy 
implementation – the federal determines the grand picture, while the local 
organizations adapt the mission to local setting and deliver the concrete services. In 
this way, “the net result is that the effective power to determine a policy’s outcome 
rests with local deliverers, not with federal administrators” (157). Based on the 




quantitative findings in chapter four, it is not surprising that the chapter here tends to 
rely on the “backward mapping” logic and the street-level perspective in particular. 
 
Lipsky (1980) defines these local public service organizations (such as schools, 
hospitals, police offices and welfare agencies) as street-level bureaucracies and the 
front-line workers within as street-level bureaucrats (SLBs). He argues that working 
in the conditions of huge caseloads, ambiguous agency goals, and inadequate 
resources, SLBs’ exercise of discretion is inevitable in the day-to-day implementation 
of public programs. When combined with substantial discretionary judgment and the 
requirement to interpret policy on a case-by-case basis, the gap between policy intent 
and policy action can be substantial. Therefore, “the decisions of street-level 
bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with 
uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry 
out” (Lipsky, 2010, xiii). 
 
The role of SLBs can also be understood from an organizational behavior perspective. 
Locating at the boundary between public welfare agency and its external 
constituency, SLBs actually play a critical boundary-spanning role in information 
processing and external representation (Thomson, 1967; Prottas, 1978). “Information 
from external sources comes into an organization through boundary role, and 
boundary role link organizational structure to environmental elements, whether by 
buffering, moderating, or influencing the environment” (Aldrich & Herker, 1977, 




interpret information from external environment for internal organizational 
components. In the external representation function, boundary roles serve resource 
acquisition and institutional legitimation.  
 
Summarily, SLBs typically perform these two functions, acting as a mediator 
between welfare agencies and targeted service receipts and resulting in bureaucracy’s 
dependence on its SLBs in people processing. Such dependence constitutes a source 
of power. “To the extent that information access and control is a power resource, 
boundary spanners are in an excellent structural position to convert this resource into 
actual power. … Their power is further enhanced to the degree that the nature of the 
task assigned the boundary role makes routinization of the role difficult, if not 
impossible” (Aldrich & Herker, 1977, 227).  
 
The massive use of contracting in social service delivery complicates the original 
connotation of SLBs. Under the contracting regime, contractors have partially taken 
over the functions previously performed directly by social workers. Now, contractors 
directly work with clients and provide services to achieve goals set by government 
agencies, while social workers turn to determine the client eligibility and monitor 
contractor behavior. Collectively, these two actors become new SLBs (Smith & 
Lipsky, 1993). This notion of new street-level bureaucrats is consistent with Hjern 
and Porter’s (1981) suggestion of using “implementation structures” as a unit of 




public and private organizations cooperate in the implementation of a programme” 
(214). 
 
Lipsky’s construct of SLB provides a useful perspective in studying social policy 
implementation. According to Brodkin (2003), “[t]his approach is most valuable 
when policy implementation involves change in organizational practice, discretion by 
frontline workers, and complex decisionmaking in a context of formal policy 
ambiguity and uncertainty” (151). Using the street-level approach, we could explore 
how street-level actors put policy into practice, more specifically, “what street-level 
organizations construct as policy through their informal practices, how they do it, and 
why they produce policy in the ways that they do” (Brodkin, 2011, 199). The 
robustness of this approach has been shown by numerous studies of welfare reform in 
a variety of policy areas (e.g., Brodkin, 2011; Keiser, 2010; Meyers, Glaser, & 
Donald, 1998; Riccucci, 2005). 
 
This study relies on this street-level perspective and explores the mutual adaptation of 
PBC to its local organizational setting. How is performance-based contracting being 
implemented? Do PBC and the incentive system associated work as intended to 
motive SLBs to improve service outcomes? Particularly, this study would examine: 
How do SLBs respond to PBC? How do they use their discretions under PBC? Does 
PBC motivate them to work in the “right” direction, both short-term and long-term? 
Do they use discretions to gaming the PBC? If so, how negative are they and how do 





6.3  Vocational Rehabilitation Context and Data Collection 
 
The context for examining the question of how PBC is implemented is state 
vocational rehabilitation programs. As described in chapter three, in rehabilitation 
services, VR counselors in the state agencies work with clients on eligibility 
determination and progress monitoring, while employment specialists at service 
contractors coach and counsel VR clients to find jobs. Thus, The SLBs or front-line 
workers in this setting are counselors and employment specialists. 
 
 
The main research method here is semi-structured interviews (interview questions 
attached in Appendix 2). Qualitative data for the research was collected with staff 
from local VR offices and service contractors in Indiana. Certainly, the ability to gain 
access to local offices and contractors by the researcher was indeed a criterion in 
sample selection. Generally, VR local employees were invited to have 30-40 minute 
talks concerning their experience on PBC from their own perspectives. Interviews 
were operated in spring and summer 2013, mostly through telephone, except for one 
face-to-face interview with a counselor conducted in a local VR office in 
Indianapolis. Detailed notes were taken based on interviewees’ inputs. 
 
Table 18 describes the distribution of interview samples. It is important to note that 
the goal of the interview is not to generate statistics about a population. Thus, it did 




Before interviewing SLBs, interviews with state VR program managers and area 
supervisors were conducted to collect background information and “set the stage” for 
later research. Also, content analysis of key documents relating to service contracts, 
annual state program report, and meeting minutes were conducted. Data from all 
these sources are used jointly for analysis. 
 
Table 18.  Distribution of Interview Samples 
 
 Indiana 
VR counselors 5 
Program managers (contractors) 4 
Employment specialists (contractors) 3 
 
6.4  Findings from VR Agency Perspective 
 
Views from government side on PBC effectiveness are mostly positive. Counselors 
were impressed with high costs and poor placement outcomes under the traditional 
FFS arrangement. Under FFS, due to the mechanism of reimbursement for services 
provided rather than service outcomes, there were frequently large amount of job 
development services, sometimes more than necessary, by vendors before client 
placement. So counselors saw vendors keeping providing services to clients, but 
without placing them. FFS also means labor intensive for counselors: they had to 
work closely with clients and vendors. Counselors needed to meet with clients very 
frequently (e.g., every month) to confirm their situations. Vendors were asked to 




clients. There were also a number of administrative procedures for vendors to go 
through, such as monthly billing and reporting. In contrast, PBC is easier to manage 
from government perspective. Under PBC, counselors enjoy more flexibility and less 
job burden. They stay involved, but do not track vendor behaviors that closely. 
Counselors only need to authorize milestones at the beginning and then verify clients’ 
achievement, rather than regulate detailed services vendors provided.  
 
When talking about clients’ employment outcomes, counselors were mostly 
impressed with PBC’s effect on better employment outcomes with less costs. Because 
of the financial incentives related to the milestone payment, PBC directs contractors 
to better employment outcomes. As mentioned earlier, VR services roughly include 
three steps: job development, job placement, and job retention. PBC is very effective 
in promoting placement and keeping the job (at least to case closure). For example, in 
Indiana milestone system, to receive the payment on job retention milestone, vendors 
have to help regular clients keep their jobs for at least 90 days. Indeed, success in 
longer-term placements has been a persistent challenge in VR programs. In this way, 
increased placement possibility and job tenure are most evident effectiveness of PBC. 
However, the changes on employment wages, benefits, job match, and other aspects 
of life quality under PBC are not emphasized by counselors. These are those 
vocational characteristics that are not specified explicitly by the PBC milestones. In 
these areas, both FFS and PBC might perform quite equally and lack impressive 
differences. One explanation might be that vendors under either contracting 




performance areas. In addition, counselors have no evidence to track clients’ long-
term employment and stability. 
 
Also, PBC pushes vendors to move across the service process to hit the milestones 
and receive payment. Because services would no longer be directly reimbursed by 
funding agencies under PBC, vendors have no financial incentives to hold clients and 
keep providing services to them, but pursue rapid job search and accelerated 
placements. Given that, counselors all agreed that PBC greatly reduces service 
waiting time and time clients spent to achieve placement. 
 
Up to the VR program level, PBC improves program costs in two ways. On one hand, 
due to “paying for performance” of PBC, only desired service milestones would be 
paid by funding agencies. In this way, funding agencies actually shift financial risks 
to vendors. Therefore, there is substantial saving on service costs. On the other, 
funding agencies no longer need to track vendors very closely to monitor their 
behaviors in the service process. Less administrative monitoring means a decrease in 
administrative costs, which is usually one third of total program costs. With these 
savings, VR agencies, which often suffers from overloaded service applicants, would 
extend their program capacity and serve more clients.  
 
There are certainly a number of managerial concerns/challenges some counselors saw 
in the implementation of PBC. When using PBC, government has less control of the 




substantially reduces administrative control in the service process. Under PBC, 
counselors only need initial authorization of service milestones and verification of 
milestone achievement, being largely out of touch with clients and the service 
process. Thus, PBC changes the role of counselor from director of services to a payer 
of services. It also shifts the responsibility of vocational assessment and planning 
from counselors to contractors. Some interviewees felt that PBC discounted the 
importance of the counselor role and government involvement.  
 
Such diluted government control, if not well managed, might lead to problems. The 
essence of PBC, according to Wedel and Colston (1988), is to use specified rewards 
for meeting or exceeding contract objectives and penalties for failure to meet them. 
This actually points to the critical role of incentive structure design. However, 
building consensus on outcome/milestone measurement and payment rate within 
funding agencies and with diverse contractors is not an easy work. For example, the 
milestones currently being used in contracted employment services are mostly easy-
to-observe performance measures, such as one-week placement, 90-day employment. 
Counselors did admit there should have some other milestones to consider. Some also 
mentioned whether to include some invisible measures related to positive life quality 
changes, in order to fight against potential creaming by contractors. Counselors 
observed that contractors were better at meeting some milestones than others. Also, in 
the long run, how to adjust milestones and payment rate would be challenging. As 
such, there is a risk that the incentive structure associated with PBC, if not 





With regards to creaming/gaming, counselors did put forward concerns for this 
negative potential of PBC. However, most counselors believed creaming did not 
occur frequently. They didn’t see strong evidence of creaming or less outcomes, 
although these observations were directly from intuition, rather than systematic data 
analysis. Part of the reason might be that the two-track payment system (paying 
vendors with a higher rate when serving people with higher degree of disabilities) 
effectively address the creaming problem. However, counselors noticed vendors 
supported PBC generally due to the flexibility vendor have in the service process and 
complained the financial risks vendors face. This financial pressure had make some 
vendors drop off due to poor service performance. So, this pressure might make 
vendors less engaged in service process, or even lead to deterioration. 
 
Generally, VR counselors were consistently satisfied with PBC. However, they did 
admit that PBC might not work in every situation. Hourly payment is still needed, 
particularly when considerable specific services are required. Thus, even though 
system-based conversion from FFS to PBC is necessary, some usage of hourly 
payment should still be allowed.  
 
6.5  Findings from Contractor Perspective 
 
Unlike VR counselors, contractors hold a quite mixed attitude towards PBC. The 
same as counselors, contractors welcome the flexibility associated with PBC in 




funding agencies. When working under PBC, they could take activities they think are 
necessary to achieve milestone outcomes. Because only milestone outcomes would be 
evaluated by VR agencies, vendor behaviors are free from strict administrative 
control. All contractors interviewed were very much impressed with the decrease in 
the amount of time they spent in administrative reporting and paperwork. In general, 
contractors support PBC in that it promises more rapid initial assessments, faster VR 
authorizations (due to less administrative paperwork), less paperwork and reporting, 
and less scrutiny by counselors. Although more discretion does not mean better 
service quality or more innovative service methods, contractors are more likely to 
serve clients in the ways that they believe are best practices.  
 
PBC also encourages contractors to work with clients more intensively, at least in the 
early placement process. Contractors reported that they conducted more in-person 
contacts and spent more evaluation time with clients under PBC, in order to place 
clients in good jobs that clients would want to keep. However, such improvements in 
service quality with clients might be due to the motivation of achieving milestones 
and securing funding in the shortest time. The incentives of rapid placement might 
lead to temporary jobs to gain reimbursement at earlier stages at the expense of 
longer-term jobs. Some clients left jobs because they did not like them or failed to 
accommodate to workplace. It partly indicates that the employment support services 
contractors provide in the service process before placements might not be sufficient. 
In short, PBC might detract from the desired outcomes to the extent that contractors 




contractors might use enhanced interactions with clients early in the process to 
terminate unmotivated or highly difficult client earlier in the process to avoid 
potential risks. 
 
Contractors were very concerned with the financial risks shifted from funding 
agencies: contractors would not be reimbursed until milestones are achieved. Some 
contractors complained that PBC undermined the vocational philosophy, changing 
from serving clients’ overall vocational needs to a narrow focus on meeting 
milestones. Although they didn’t admit they selected clients based on the possibility 
of future employment, they did emphasize their employment programs had budgetary 
constraints. Due to the high financial pressures under PBC, contractors have to 
consider the cost and risk of serving a certain client. As for employment outcomes, 
contractors emphasized that because of financial reasons, they would pay attention to 
clients’ milestone achievement that would lead to payment. However, they didn’t 
think PBC would induce them to engage in creaming/gaming behaviors, achieving 
measured performance at the cost of unmeasured ones. Contractors believed other 
non-financial incentives under FFS and PBC were of no difference. Thus, they didn’t 
notice significant different in clients’ employment quality, such as wage, job match.   
 
Generally, contractors understood the rationale behind the change from FFS to PBC. 
However, contractors were anxious about the high financial risk PBC would pose on 
their running employment programs, despite the flexibility they enjoyed under PBC. 




services. At least, some contractors proposed a hybrid contracting model with a 
combination of FFS and PBC. Funding agencies should use FFS for difficult clients, 
while PBC for regular ones.  
 
6.6  Conclusion 
 
Here, let’s summarize the findings from this qualitative piece. For VR counselors and 
service contractors, the first impression they have concerning PBC is the flexibility, 
in either administrative or service sense, PBC brings. On the counselor side, they no 
longer need to monitor contractors very closely throughout the service process. 
Rather, they just authorize milestones and verify whether they have been really 
achieved by clients, becoming a little away from clients and vendors. On the 
contractor side, without such administrative control, they could serve clients in the 
way they believe to be the most professional one. Thus, in this regard, both parties 
expressed strong satisfaction with PBC. 
 
Second, PBC, through financial incentive restructure, directs contractors away from 
service delivery per se towards milestones along job development, job placement, and 
job retention. Following this logic, contractors, in order to receive service 
reimbursement, devote much attention to these milestones. So counselors could 
obverse clients under PBC find jobs sooner and are more likely to keep jobs at least 
till reaching the milestone on case closure. But PBC’s change on other areas of 




Given that PBC has no touch on these indicators, contractors explained the incentives 
in these areas might be equal in FFS and PBC.  
 
Third, there are some unsupported clues on creaming/gaming. For contractors, the 
financial incentives of rapid movement across milestones might lead to clients’ 
temporary jobs at earlier stage at the cost of job fit and longer-term jobs. However, 
whether and to what extent would PBC differ from FFS in this regard are ambiguous. 
For counselors, although there are concerns for creaming/gaming, they actually have 
no evidence to show these strategic behaviors indeed exist and play roles.  
 
At the beginning of the last chapter, this project aims to evaluate PBC effectiveness 
from two perspectives using different methods. The previous chapter employs a 
quantitative quasi-experimental method to compare the impacts of two contracting 
approaches on individual employment outcomes. The present chapter, through 
qualitative semi-interviews, explores how PBC was implemented by street-level 
actors, both VR counselors and contractors. How do these two perspectives and 





Appendix 2.  Interview Questions on the Effectiveness of Indiana RBF 
 
Questions for VR Counselors:  
 
1. What are the major differences between FFS and RBF, from your perspective? 
 
2. What do you like most about RBF and what do you like least? 
 
3. How might RBF change service activities and process? 
(1) Service method (best practices: more job development, search, and match) 
(2) Client selection (two-tier payment useful?) 
(3) Service costs (purchase costs and administrative costs) 
 
4. How might RBF change clients’ employment outcomes? 
(1) Employment results 
(2) Time to placement 
(3) Employment quality (wage, working hours, job match, customer 
satisfaction) 
(4) Long-term employment and stability 
 
5. How might RBF change your work as a counselor, and relationship with 
service providers?  
(1) Work with clients 
(2) Oversight service providers 
 
6. How do service providers view RBF, from your perspective? What are their 
concerns? 
 
7. All things considered, which funding mechanism does you actually prefer, 
RBF or FFS? 
 















Questions for Contractors: 
 
1. What are the major differences between FFS and RBF, from your perspective? 
(1) RBF: Like most? Like least? 
(2) FFS: Like most? Like least? 
 
2. How might RBF change service process? 
(1) Client selection  
(2) Best practices 
 
3. How might RBF change clients’ employment outcomes? 
(1) Possibility of employment 
(2) Time to placement 
(3) Employment quality (wage, working hours, customer satisfaction) 
(4) Long-term employment and stability 
 
4. How might RBF change your work as a service provider, and relationship with 
counselors?  
(1) Work with clients (consumer evaluation, job development, job search, 
documentation, and in-person contacts) 
(2) Oversight from VR agency 
 
5. All things considered, which funding mechanism does you actually prefer, RBF 
or FFS? 
 





Chapter 7.  Two Faces of Contracting, Two Kinds of Control 
 
7.1  The Effectiveness of PBC as a Formal Arrangement 
 
No doubt, PBC is mostly a formal contracting endeavor. Through restructuring 
formal contract design, or more precisely, changing the financial incentives from 
“paying for process” to “paying for result,” PBC draws contractors’ attention towards 
the results of service delivery, rather than service delivery per se. However, as 
discussed in chapter three, the appropriate contract design for human services is very 
daunting. Human services always feature their ambiguousness in both task 
programmability and outcome measurability. This puts human services mostly within 
what Weisbrod (1988) calls Type II dimension of service attributes13. In this way, 
neither behavior-oriented contracts (FFS) nor outcome-oriented contracts (PBC) fit 
seamlessly with human services. Given this, the quesiton becomes which contract 
arrangement is less risky. 
 
The entire research is to evaluate the effectiveness of PBC in human services, using 
Indiana vocational rehabilitation program as a case. Towards this goal, the previous 
two chapters employ two perspectives and two research methods. In chapter five, 
PBC effectiveness was assessed from a service outcome perspective, based on a 
13 Weisbrod (1988) differentiates between Type I dimension of service attributes (that 
are relatively easy to monitor or assess) and Type II dimension of service attributes 
(that are relatively difficult to monitor). 
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quantitative quasi-experiment to compare the impacts of PBC and FFS on individual 
employment outcomes. In chapter six, PBC effectiveness was explored using 
qualitative semi-interviews with VR counselors and contractors about PBC 
implementation. Clearly, both quantitative and qualitative methods have weaknesses. 
Quantitative and qualitative methods follow different paradigms, assumptions and 
have different strengths in information processing (Firestone, 1987). Quantitative 
methods, based on a positivist paradigm, “produce factual, reliable outcome data that 
are usually generalizable to some larger population.” In contrast, qualitative methods, 
grounded on a phenomenological paradigm, “generate rich, detailed, valid process 
data that usually leave the study participants’ perspectives intact” (Steckler, McLeroy, 
Goodman, & Bird, 1992, 2). Accordingly, a research strategy advocated in 
methodology literature is triangulation, “the combination of methodologies in the 
study of the same phenomenon” (Denzin, 1978, 291). It has been suggested to see 
quantitative and qualitative methods as complementary, used to compensate for the 
limitations of each other and cross-validate to gain greater accuracy and confidence in 
judgments (Jick, 1979; Mathison, 1988). 
 
The present research tends to follow this “triangulation” logic, through collecting and 
analyzing different kinds of data bearing on the use of PBC in VR employment 
services. Not surprisingly, the findings from the two methods, through illuminating, 
are not exactly the same, but some general conclusions could be derived. The 
effectiveness of PBC, from a service outcome perspective, means clients find jobs 




an organizational perspective, effectiveness might be close to administrative 
efficiency and flexibility in running VR programs and providing employment 
services. 
 
In the service effectiveness sense, PBC performs better in the areas that are captured 
by milestones. In other words, compared with FFS, PBC is more likely to achieve the 
milestones. Because of the financial incentives, contractors push clients they serve to 
move across the milestones rapidly. Although PBC has little impact on unmeasured 
areas, there is no strong evidence of creaming/gaming. Contractors might be involved 
in strategic behaviors in some cases, but those behaviors haven’t been found to result 
in deterioration in service outcomes. 
 
In the organizational effectiveness sense, PBC are well endorsed by funding agencies 
for its efficiency and flexibility. VR counselors become relatively free from intensive 
work with clients and contractors and enjoy much flexibility in managing the service 
process. Funding agencies spend the money and get the results they want, without 
seeing severe unintended outcomes. For contractors, PBC would be a double-edged 
sword. They support PBC in that it allows more exercises of professional discretion, 
but complain high financial risks they burden. This risk is indeed a big managerial 
challenge. If not appropriately handled by public managers, it might force contractors 





To an extent, PBC seems more promising in both service effectiveness and 
organizational effectiveness. However, it also implies PBC effectiveness might not be 
well-rounded and should not be exaggerated. After reviewing the use of PBC in 
federal agencies, GAO (2002) doubts “whether agencies have a good understanding 
of performance-based contracting and how to take full advantage of it” (2). 
Accordingly, a policy question would arise: how to improve the effectiveness of PBC, 
or how to take advantage of it?  
 
From the formal contracting perspective, the most direct response would be 
optimizing the PBC design, such as fixing performance measures, redefining the 
connection between performance indicators and contact compensation, and changing 
incentive structures. For example, Hill’s (2006) study of casework task configurations 
in welfare-to-work programs finds that the separation of measurable and 
unmeasurable tasks among frontline workers would contribute to program 
effectiveness. Heinrich and Choi (2007) suggest changing performance measures 
periodically before contractors learn the ways to gaming the measures. This would 
cause a “competition of learning.” When launching a PBC system, both government 
and contractor start their learning activities, the pros and cons of that system. If 
government learns faster, they could find ways to fix the problems. If contactors learn 
faster, they might gaming the system. Anyway, both suggestions warn that PBC 





However, these technical efforts on restructuring PBC systems would hardly be free 
themselves from the puzzle of introducing performance management to human 
service contracting mentioned previously. More broadly, this illustrates what Van 
Thiel and Leeuw (2002) call “performance paradox” in the public sector – 
“characteristics of the public sector can be counterproductive to developing and using 
performance indicators” (267). In this way, the use of PBC in public human service 
programs might always be at the risk of “rewarding A, while hoping for B.” A more 
feasible way to optimize PBC endeavor might be a relational one. 
 
7.2  Managerial Implications from a Relational Contracting Perspective 
 
The theoretical framework in chapter three presents two faces of contracting, formal 
and relational. Relational contracting perspective highlights the role of relational 
sanction and social interaction in contractual fulfillment. It suggests relying on 
relational exchange as a social control mechanism in contracting management. These 
two faces of contracting remind that the coexistence of these two mechanisms that 
public managers should devote themselves to simultaneously. To some extent, such 
combination of formal and informal contracting reflects the nature of contracting 
management in public administration context: well-planned and written contracts to 
meet the formal accountability demand, and negotiation and discretion to satisfy the 
flexibility concerns in service delivery (DeHoog, 1990).  
 
However, the efforts on PBC innovation and implementation tend to ignore the 




vocational rehabilitation services was disturbed by the highly uncertain nature of 
employment services. Therefore, we could see incomplete improvement in 
employment performance, mostly in targeted performance areas, and the risk of 
contractor opportunistic behaviors. Rather than the attempt to use other formal 
devices to awkwardly improve PBC effort, this project suggests introducing relational 
contracting, with a focus on relationship and trust building, as a supplement. 
 
Relational contracting, as Sclar (2000) suggests, “transform[s] the notion of 
contracting from a market-based arrangement to one rooted in interorganizational 
trust” (123). This notion is also termed by sociologists as “embeddedness,” to 
recognize the role of socially embedded relationships in economic exchange (e.g., 
Powell 1990; Uzzi, 1997). Granovetter (1985) argues that formal exchanges would 
“become overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of trust and 
abstention from opportunism” (490). Exchanges characterized by trust are generally 
found to be more successful (Dyer, 1997; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Ring and Van 
de Ven 1994). 
 
Therefore, relational exchanges, based on social components (Macneil, 1980), are 
always associated with a higher level of trust. Here the research adopts Rousseau, 
Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer’s (1998) definition of trust: “a psychological state 
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of the 
intentions or behavior of another” (395). They also identify two preconditions for 




opportunities for trust. Trust would not be needed if exchanges could be conducted 
with complete certainty. Although high risks might force two parties to seek other 
alternatives, interdependence between parties would glue them together. 
Interdependence means that the goals of one party’s could not be achieved without 
the participation of the other’s. These two conditions further imply the relevance of 
the discussion on trust here to service contracting. In human services, governments 
heavily rely on third-party actors to deliver various services to citizens. However, due 
to the uncertain nature of human services mentioned above, contracting performance 
is at the risk of contractor misconducts. 
 
The role of trust in interorganizational exchanges and collaborations has been 
discussed extensively by scholars from a variety of disciplines such as sociology, 
psychology, and economics. From a sociological perspective, trust acts as a functional 
alternative to rational prediction for the reduction of complexity in social life (Lewis 
& Weigert, 1985; Luhmann, 1979). From a transaction cost viewpoint, trust reduces 
transaction costs by reducing both ex ante and ex post opportunism (Williamson, 
1993). Ostrom (1998) suggests trust and reputation for trustworthiness as core factors 
in collective actions, potentially reducing uncertainty and transaction costs. 
Management scholars McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer (2003) propose trust as an 
organizing principle, structuring and mobilizing organizational components. In the 
structuring role, trust affects “the development, maintenance, and modification of a 
system of relative positions and links among actors situated in a social space” (94). In 




to combine, coordinate, and use them in joint activities, and to direct them toward the 
achievement of organizational goals” (97). In short, as Zand (1972) summarizes, trust 
“conveys appropriate information, permits mutuality of influence, encourages self-
control, and avoids abuse of the vulnerability of others” (238). 
 
The efforts on trust conceptualization tend to acknowledge its multi-faceted nature 
(Williamson, 1993). Lewis and Weigert (1985) distinguish three dimensions of trust: 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dimensions. To them, cognitive familiarity, 
emotional bond, and behavioral enactment construct the sociology base of trust. 
Zucker (1986) also identifies three modes of trust production: (1) characteristic-
based, (2) process-based, and (3) institutional-based. Characteristic-based trust can be 
formed on the basis of individual social characteristics such as ethnicity and 
background. Exchange partners with similar characteristics are easier to engage in 
collective actions in that they might believe such exchange would satisfy both parties. 
Trust can also result from previous and expected future exchanges, i.e., a record of 
reputation. In institutional-based trust, exchanges are embedded in social practices 
and trust is thus tied to broad societal institutions. 
 
This paper builds on Zucker’s classification. Indeed, characteristic-based trust has 
been well observed. For example, as mentioned in the previous chapters, in human 
service contracting, public managers tend to trust nonprofits’ social-mission driven 
would prevent nonprofit contractors’ opportunistic behaviors. This mission/value 




partner with nonprofit contractors. The following paragraphs focus more on process-
based and institutional-based trust and discuss implications that public managers 
might consider when optimizing PBC efforts from a relational contracting 
perspective. A summary is provided in Table 19. 
 
Table 19.  Mode of Trust Production and Implications for PBC 
 
Mode of trust 
production 
Basis Implications for PBC efforts 
Characteristic-based Individual attributes • Contractor’s nonprofit 
status 
Process-based Past or expected 
exchanges 
• Collaboration and 
negotiation 
• Time boundlessness 
Institutional-based Social structures • Professionalism 
• Best practice 
 
Source: Zucker (1986). 
 
Collaboration and Negotiation 
 
Reciprocal obligation should be a key principle in the use of PBC. Due to the 
complicate and dynamic nature of PBC, the implementation of PBC as a system-
based change would not succeed without the commitment from all stakeholders. After 
all, the central goal of PBC is to meet client needs while addressing the financial 
realities of both funding agencies and service providers. For example, as found in the 
last chapter, the high financial risks burdened by service contractors under PBC, if 




address the dysfunctional response is to collaborate with stakeholders throughout 
contracting process. Such collaboration itself acts as a sign of commitment and a 
tangible expression of mutual trust. 
 
The collaboration should start in contract planning and design stage. It requires the 
participation from three groups of stakeholders: funding agencies, service contractors, 
and clients (O’Brien & Revell, 2005). Because the process and outcome of human 
service delivery are relatively uncertain, stakeholders should reach at least some 
consensus on incentives and disincentives associated with the PBC design, such as 
essential milestones, fee structure. Also, the formal contract can be seen as a 
coordination mechanism to specify what goals all parties aim for and how they want 
to achieve these goals. The emphasis here can be more on the positive (shared 
mission, goals, etc.) than the negative (legally enforceable provisions and penalty). 
Overall, this collaborative planning should ensure that the design addresses each 
party’s concerns and eliminate possible resistance to change. It creates a transparent 
and participatory process that could enhance the feasibility of PBC design and the 
likelihood of full implementation.   
 
The development of PBC is also a learning process, for both funding agencies and 
contractors. Throughout PBC implementation, tensions and conflicts could be 
anticipated. Thus, ongoing negotiation and system modifications are necessary. At the 
early conversion (from FFS to PBC) stage, substantial time and resources are needed 




and develop shared commitment with them. After the shared development phase, the 
use and availability of multiple communication strategies to disseminate information 
would enhance implementation. The stakeholders still need to meet periodically to 
assess the implantation and make recommended changes. Funding agencies might 
hold annual program feedback meetings or annual on-site visits to collect contractors’ 
and clients’ inputs. These regular and stable interactions reduce opportunistic 
behaviors and support the development of commitment and adaptation. In this way, 
trust is formed incrementally and enhanced through repeated interactions. (Dyer, 




To an extent, contractor behaviors reflect their expectations for future exchanges. In 
discrete time-bound transactions, people might respond to calculations of short-term 
advantage. In contrast, open-ended contracts imply potential benefits from future 
collaborations and thus provide a safeguard against opportunistic behaviors. Open-
ended contracts not only convey a sign of commitment and mutual trust at the 
beginning of exchanges, but promote trust formation and enhancement in the long run 
due to repeated interactions mentioned above. Researches find exchanges that operate 
for a pre-specified duration would behave differently from those under a setting of 
continuing relationships and interdependence. Axelrod (1984) suggests compared 
with open-ended contracts, time-bound contracts are less likely to be self-enforcing 




time-bound contracts would cause a greater threat of opportunistic behavior and 
contribute to contracting complexity. 
 
Taken together, the arguments here suggest the use of open-ended contracts or at least 
longer-term contracts. Currently, in vocational rehabilitation programs studied in the 
present project, for example, service contract duration is usually one year, with an 
option of one-year extension contingent on satisfactory performance. Under this 
specified short duration, contractors might consider short-term opportunistic 
behaviors. Of course, continuing relationships do not necessarily mean nice. 
Relational sanctions would not always produce cooperation. Rather, they might lock 
funding agencies into dependent positions (Williams, 1983). However, this point here 
does not exclude other formal enforcement mechanisms such as performance 
assessment and financial auditing, but suggest the combination of open-ended 




Professionalism achieves social legitimacy through specialized expertise and 
qualifications. Under information asymmetry, professionalism acts as a signal of 
quality, ensuring that professionalized organizations are in compliance with 
established social expectations and professional standards. It is termed by Ouchi 
(1979) as a “ritualized, ceremonial forms of control” (844). Professionalism means 




professionalization processes could be allowed to participate in the service program 
operation and service delivery process. For human service organizations, 
accreditation is a kind of quality assurance that an organization meets the quality 
standards established by the profession. Accredited organizations are required to 
follow similar service procedures and occupational norms, which convey an 
assurance of quality and credibility. For service workers, professional schooling and 
membership would be a channel to internalize the desired attitudes, values, and 
beliefs. For nonprofit human service organizations, professional values are also 
reflected by a professional workforce that an organization uses in service jurisdictions 
and management. These “organizational professionals” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) 
generally hold occupational norms and standards, implying a higher degrees of 
professionalism in organizational operation. 
 
Documentation of Best Practices 
 
Another somewhat relevant to professionalism is the “best practice” approach. 
Funding agencies might document and disseminate periodical reports, identifying the 
contractors with best service outcomes and their best practices in service delivery. 
This would create some informal pressure on service contractors with poor 
performance in their profession. However, the approach builds on the assumption that 
service contractors have relatively strong self-motivation to provide better services 
and care about professional recognition (Else et al., 1992). If so, they would wish to 





7.3  Conclusion: Control, Trust, and Contracting Management 
 
In the United States, government contracting is widely and durably used as an indirect 
government tool in the landscape of service delivery and policy implementation. This 
governing by contracting model has fundamentally redefined the U.S. governance 
system, in both political and managerial senses. It also highlights the imperative of 
contracting management to ensure high-quality results. However, public managers are 
often frustrated by their insufficient management capacity while working with 
contractors. To address this “smart-buyer” challenge, public management scholarship 
and practice in past three decades have conducted a huge amount of exploration of 
effective contracting management. Inspired by performance management movement, 
PBC represents one of the most recent efforts. PBC incorporates performance 
measures in contract specification and makes contract compensations attached to 
contractors’ performance achievement. Theoretically, PBC promises quality services, 
better outcomes, and less monitoring.  
 
Given the potential benefits, governments at all levels have shown substantial and 
continuous enthusiasm for PBC. In human services, particularly, state and local 
governments have expressed growing interests in using PBC in their service 
acquisition. However, the burgeoning popularity of PBC lacks sufficient evidence to 
show its promised benefits are actually achievable. In particular, the introduction of 
PBC into human service systems needs to address the effectiveness problem (whether 




interorganizational change). The present research mostly focuses on the first problem, 
while the findings here might shed some light on the second problem.  
 
After building the theoretical framework which incorporates the literature on formal 
and relational contracting, this research explores the effectiveness question using 
Indiana vocational rehabilitation program as a case. Inspired by the literature on 
network effectiveness, this project evaluates PBC effectiveness from two 
perspectives: service outcome and participating organizations. Putting all the findings 
together, this project proposes that PBC seems more promising than FFS in human 
services. However, PBC effectiveness could not be well-rounded and should not be 
exaggerated. PBC, as a formal mechanism, adjusts contractor behavior through 
redefining incentive structure in formal contract design. Unfortunately, this formal 
effort of using PBC in vocational rehabilitation services was disturbed by the highly 
uncertain nature of employment services. Thus, there are only incomplete 
improvement in employment performance, mostly in targeted performance areas, and 
risks of contractor opportunistic behaviors.  
 
Indeed, the research and the practice of PBC tend to ignore the relational face of 
contracting. Relational contracting as a social control system, using informal and 
normative mechanisms (largely represented by interorganizational trust) to eliminate 
interest and goal incongruence between contracting parties, tends to encourages 
appropriate behaviors that could lead to desirable collaborative outcomes. In this line 




might consider when using PBC, such as ongoing collaboration and negotiation in 
contract planning and implementation, long-term or open-ended contracts, and 
professionalism. 
 
In sum, this project represents the first attempt to systematically examine PBC 
effectiveness in human services. It shows the difficulties and dynamics of introducing 
performance management to human service contracting. For various political and 
pragmatic reasons, performance management is everywhere (Behn, 2003). However, 
largely due to human services’ ambiguous performance and high provider discretion, 
PBC in human services are always at the risk of “rewarding A, while hoping for B.” 
Therefore, the project reminds that the launch of PBC should be very deliberate and 
careful. The efforts of introducing PBC to human service provision are often 
undermined by imperfect performance measures and high provider discretion. The 
situation becomes worse-off when contractors use discretion to “gaming” the 
performance measures. Generally, in human services, not all aspects of performance 
can be clearly defined and measured. Along the full spectrum of the performance of a 
human service, there is some portion that is straightforward and easy to capture, such 
as successful placement and time-to-placement in this study. But there must be a 
certain portion, especially related to service quality and long-term effects, which is 
elusive to observe and define, such as positive quality-of-life change and long-term 
stability. In this way, the use of PBC with surrogate performance measures to adjust 
for the entire performance domain inevitably leads to a mismatch, ending up with 




more discretion involved in human service delivery, the less portion of service 
performance can be clearly captured and measured (Lipsky, 1980). The broader 
ambiguous portion of service performance, the less effectiveness PBC could produce 
as a formal control mechanism, and the more room left for relational contracting to fit 
in. In conclusion, in order to take full advantage of PBC, public managers should pay 
attention to the relational side of contracting and devote administrative resources to 
building trust with contractors. 
 
More broadly, the project underscores two key components of contracting 
management: (formal) control and trust. The issue of control is a lingering question in 
organizational management. Studies of management and organization behaviors have 
long examined effective ways to exercise control of collective actions (e.g., Barnard, 
1938; Etzioni, 1964). In contracting management, control, as a power of directing, 
can be reflected in the provisions of the contract, monitoring, and levying of 
penalties. It includes monitoring of information flows, design of incentives, and 
allocation of risks. These formal mechanisms are absolutely necessary given the 
public accountability requirements. However, the effectiveness of such control is 
dependent upon the measurability of job-related behavior or outcome. When formal 
control systems are disturbed by various sociological and psychological factors, 
formal mechanisms become less effective and more costly. Indeed, due to 
information asymmetry and uncertainty, contracting out always features some 
ambiguity, even if in the areas other than human services. Government will never 




Thus, flexibility enjoyed by contractors is unavoidable. In this way, there must be 
areas that control mechanisms could not reach, but social control might emerge to 
play a role. Social control, based on social and normative influence, targets norms, 
values, and attitudes that may be relevant to desired collective outcomes (O’Reilly & 
Chatman, 1996). The center of social control is trust, which could create an 
environment where the mutually agreed contract goals become self-enforcing. This 
hybrid contracting management approach would help public managers address the 
smart-buy challenge and promote high-quality results. 
 
Certainly, the arguments here are derived from the case study of Indiana vocational 
rehabilitation program. The external validity of a case study, as Yin (2009) suggests, 
lies in “analytical generalization” through replication rather than “statistical 
generalization” through inference from a sample to a population. This replication 
logic in theory testing and development demands that the robustness of a theory be 
confirmed only by replicating the findings in different contexts. In this sense, the 
research here represents one of the studies that systematically examines the 
effectiveness of PBC in human service provision. The findings here might be used 
only for conditional, contingent generalizations (George & Bennett, 2005) to other 
cases which are similar to the one under study. This project has no intention to 
generalize in order to infer the causal mechanisms under various contexts, although 
the findings here to some extent coincide with several recent studies in different 
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